Incident de Havilland Canada DHC-8-311 G-BRYK, Friday 16 May 1997
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Date:Friday 16 May 1997
Time:11:15
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8C model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-311
Owner/operator:British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways
Registration: G-BRYK
MSN: 284
Year of manufacture:1991
Engine model:P&W Canada PW123
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 45
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Location:Near Birmingham Airport (BHX/EGBB) -   United Kingdom
Phase: En route
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Southampton Airport (SOU/EGHI)
Destination airport:Newcastle Airport (NCL/EGNT)
Investigating agency: AAIB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
During a scheduled flight from Southampton to Newcastle, one of the cabin attendants reported a
burning smell around seat Rows 7 to 9 which was confirmed by the passengers. The No 1
cabin attendant was instructed to switch off all the passenger service unit (PSU) reading lights,
monitor the situation and report back. The first officer subsequently went back to the cabin to
investigate, but since he was unable to detect any burning smell, the decision was made to continue
to Newcastle. However, some 5-10 minutes later, the cabin attendant reported that the smell had
returned. The commander decided to declare an emergency and divert to Birmingham. Normal
approach and landing procedures were used, as there was no smoke or fire in the cabin. Following
an uneventful landing, the cabin attendant reported that the situation had not deteriorated. It was
therefore decided that an emergency evacuation was not necessary, and the passengers disembarked
normally on the stand.

A subsequent investigation revealed that an air conditioning duct had become disconnected above
seat Row 6 C/D. It was apparent that some 'fluff' from the duct had fallen onto the back of one of the
PSU lights and had generated an acrid smell. The sections of duct are normally joined together by
means of nylon 'tie-wrap' bands and adhesive-backed fabric tape. It was noted that in this case the
duct had been joined by the use of aluminum 'speed tape', and it was loss of adhesion of this that
had allowed the duct joint to separate.

There is seldom a requirement for the ducting in this area to be disturbed, and it is likely that the
duct joint was modified by a previous operator. The PSU panels are subject to maintenance activity
on a relatively frequent basis, and the airline is instructing its maintenance personnel to check that
air duct joints are to the correct standard whenever such maintenance is carried out on its Dash 8
aircraft.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: AAIB
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration:
Download report: Final report

Sources:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f3aced915d1371000495/dft_avsafety_pdf_500339.pdf

https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/8002715 (Photo)

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
04-Apr-2025 12:51 Justanormalperson Added
04-Apr-2025 12:51 ASN Updated [Accident report, ]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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