You can contribute by submitting additional or updated information.
| Date: | Monday 10 February 1997 |
| Time: | 17:50 |
| Type: |  de Havilland Canada DHC-8-311 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways |
| Registration: | G-BRYP |
| MSN: | 315 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1992 |
| Engine model: | P&W Canada PW123 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 30 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor, repaired |
| Location: | South of Aberdeen -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Aberdeen International Airport (ABZ/EGPD) |
| Newcastle Airport (NCL/EGNT) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The crew reported for duty at 1405 hrs to operate a scheduled service Bristol, Newcastle, Aberdeen,
Newcastle, Bristol. The first two sectors were uneventful and the aircraft left the stand at Aberdeen
for the sector to Newcastle with the commander as handling pilot. The history of the flight was
reconstructed from the account provided by the crew and from the FDR.
The anti ice systems were selected 'ON' when the aircraft took off from Aberdeen at 1748 hrs; there
was a strong gusting crosswind and it was raining. The initial climb was normal and the landing gear
and flaps were retracted. The Standard Operating Procedure is then to deselect the auto-feather
system and select climb power, however the commander decided to retain take off power in order to
expedite the climb through the layer of moderate to severe turbulence they were experiencing; he
informed the first officer of his intention and asked for the bleed air to be switched on.The first
officer actioned the after take off check from memory, however he did not deselect the auto-feather
system because climb power had not yet been requested.
The commander selected climb power at about 2,100 feet amsl and asked the first officer to reduce
the propellers to the climb setting. Both propellers were reduced to 900 propeller RPM (Np) and the
torques increased momentarily to 100% before being reselected to 80%. The auto-feather system was
not deselected. No 1 engine torque increased slowly from 80% until stabilizing at around 90%.
However, No 2 engine torque increased rapidly to 111% and then returned to 80% over a period of
12 seconds. This was the first of many excursions of No 2 engine torque; most were in the range
10% to 20% and continued for a further 100 seconds until the commander retarded No 2 power
lever to about 62%. These excursions in Np and torque are shown in Figure 1. ATC was told of the
problem and the climb was continued with No 1 engine torque at 90%, and No 2 engine torque still
at 62%; both propellers were at 900 Np.
When the aircraft climbed out of icing conditions the commander selected the No 2 engine intake
bypass doors to be closed. Shortly afterwards, as the aircraft climbed through about 7,400 feet
amsl, No 1 propeller suddenly feathered, reducing to 400 Np and the torque on No 2 engine rose by
about 15%. In this installation it is possible to feather the propeller blades without stopping the
engine. Because the engine had not actually failed, fuel was still being scheduled to maintain the
level demanded by the power lever and consequently No 1 engine torque increased rapidly to a peak
value of 120% before being reduced to below 100%. About 100 seconds later No 1 engine torque
was further reduced to 38%, the flight idle value, and No 2 engine torque was increased slightly to
85%.
The UNSCHEDULED PROPELLER FEATHERING drill was consulted; the drill calls for the
shutdown of the engine associated with the feathered propeller. The flight deck indications were that
No 1 engine parameters were normal. Because he now thought they had two, apparently unrelated,
problems the commander decided not to shut down No 1 engine. An emergency was declared and
the aircraft diverted to RAF Leuchars.
The first officer tried to un-feather No 1 propeller using the alternate system but was unsuccessful.
As the aircraft passed about 7,000 feet amsl during descent to Leuchars, the commanders elected the
No 1 engine bypass door to closed and reduced No 2 engine torque to about 58%. This disarmed the
auto-feather system and No 1 propeller suddenly unfeathered; Np increased rapidly to 1,200 and the
torque fell to zero. There was a yaw to the rightof around 2 to 2.5° as the propeller unfeathered and
it appears that the commander interpreted this as a failure of the No 2 engine because, about 10
seconds later, he retarded No 2 condition lever to the START/FEATHER detent which caused the
propeller blade angle to coarsen towards the feather position. The power lever remained as selected
and No 2 engine torque increased rapidly to 100% before reducing to 55% as the lever was
subsequently retarded to FLIGHT IDLE. After 5 seconds No 2 engine torque reduced to zero in
response to the condition lever being moved fully back to FUEL OFF. Figure 2 shows the engine
torque, Np and fuel flow.
The first officer immediately told the commander that he thought he had taken the wrong action and
the latter quickly moved the condition lever fully forward to the MAX GOVERNING position.
The Np immediately increased to 1,200 and, because the igniters were still selected ON, the engine
relit. The propeller was reduced to 900 Np but because the torque gauge pointer was at zero and the
digital readout showed four dashes the crew assumed that the engine had indeed flamed out. The
FDR was also sensing a zero torque output at this stage but other parameters such as fuel-flow and
gas generator RPM (Ng) showed that the engine was still running with the power lever at a
moderate setting. The first officer attempted to relight the engine by first retarding the condition
lever to START/FEATHER. The Np reduced to 300 but the start switch would not engage as the
engine was already running. After 17 seconds the power lever was retarded to FLIGHT
IDLE, resulting in a Np of 100.
The approach was flown with both engines running normally but with the No 2 propeller feathered
and the power lever at FLIGHT IDLE; No 1 engine condition lever remained at MAX GOVERNING. An uneventful landing was made at Leuchars at about 1814hrs.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ed34e5274a1317000179/dft_avsafety_pdf_500839.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/10947278 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 28 February 1999 | G-BRYP | British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways | 0 | Plymouth City Airport, Roborough, Plymouth, Devon | |
sub |
| 12 August 1999 | G-BRYP | British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways | 0 | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) | |
sub |
| 19 September 2023 | 17-01609 | US ARMY (Golden Knights) | 0 | San Diego-Gillespie Field, CA (SEE/KSEE) |  |
sub |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 04-Apr-2025 14:08 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 04-Apr-2025 14:09 | ASN | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2025 Flight Safety Foundation