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| Date: | Thursday 12 August 1999 |
| Time: | 06:10 |
| Type: |  de Havilland Canada DHC-8-311 Dash 8 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways |
| Registration: | G-BRYP |
| MSN: | 315 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1992 |
| Engine model: | P&W Canada PW123 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 54 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial, repaired |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Standing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) |
| Glasgow International Airport (GLA/EGPF) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft had been parked at Manchester overnight, during which time a routine pre-flight
engineering inspection had been carried out. This inspection revealed that the hydraulic fluid
contents of both systems were found to be above the required minimum dispatch quantities. It was
subsequently ascertained that this inspection had been carried out shortly after the arrival of the
aircraft during the previous evening.
The flight crew reported at 0505 hrs in order to operate a scheduled passenger service to Glasgow,
which was planned to depart at 0605 hrs. During the course of the flight crew external pre-flight
inspection, the first officer noted that the remote quantity indicator for the No 1 Hydraulic System
was indicating below the minimum level acceptable for dispatch of the aircraft (1.5 US Quarts, 1.41
litres). On reboarding the aircraft, the first officer informed the commander of this condition. The
commander checked the flight deck gauge, which displayed a hydraulic fluid content slightly
higher than the remote quantity indicator. The commander indicated that he would transfer some
fluid (from the No 2 system) during the flight. There was also some discussion with Line
Maintenance Control regarding the status of a nose landing gear alternate gear extension indicator
light, which was illuminated but dim. It was decided that it was acceptable to dispatch the aircraft
in that condition.
The passenger boarding was completed and the aircraft received ATC clearance to push back from
the stand. Both engines had been started on stand prior to the pushback in accordance with the
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's).
The commander was in communication with the ground crew engineer via a headset. The
commander indicated that the brakes were released and the pushback commenced. The commander
noted that the hydraulic quantity in the No 1 system appeared to have dropped and he decided to
carry out a fluid transfer. About 15 seconds after brake release, the commander indicated to the
engineer that he was going to perform a hydraulic fluid transfer at the end of the pushback. The
engineer queried whether this was to be done with the tug attached or uncoupled. The commander
responded that the tug should remain attached. The engineer indicated that he would inform the tug
driver of this plan.
At this time, the engineer went across to the tug to inform the tug driver. The tug driver halted the
tug while he received this message from the engineer. No signals were passed to the commander
that would indicate that the pushback was complete and the aircraft had moved back only a few feet
from the parking position. The ground engineer returned to the side of the aircraft and informed the
commander that it was 'all right, no problem'.
Immediately upon receipt of this, the commander indicated to the first officer that he should pay
attention during the transfer to ensure that the fluid was being moved the correct way. As the
commander looked across the flight deck, he did not notice that the pushback had recommenced
very gently. The first officer had just completed an entry in the flight paperwork when he looked up
and realised that the aircraft had recommenced the pushback. He attempted to warn the commander
just as the commander applied the Emergency/Parking Brake as the first stage of the fluid transfer
process. The tug continued to attempt to push the aircraft back and the nose landing gear collapsed.
A quantity of hydraulic fluid was released as a spray from the area of the nose landing gear. The
ground engineer subsequently required treatment for the effects of hydraulic fluid contamination of
his skin and eyes.
After the nose landing gear collapse, several seconds elapsed before the first officer prompted the
commander regarding the shutdown of the engines, and the need to carry out a passenger address.
The first officer informed ATC and the emergency services were alerted to attend. The commander
shutdown the engines. He elected to carry out a precautionary disembarkation by means of the
normal passenger door and initiated this in consultation with the senior cabin crew member. None
of the aircraft occupants was injured.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5423038ee5274a1317000c33/dft_avsafety_pdf_500737.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/8475923 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 10 February 1997 | G-BRYP | British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways | 0 | South of Aberdeen | |
min |
| 28 February 1999 | G-BRYP | British Airways Express, opb Brymon Airways | 0 | Plymouth City Airport, Roborough, Plymouth, Devon | |
sub |
| 19 September 2023 | 17-01609 | US ARMY (Golden Knights) | 0 | San Diego-Gillespie Field, CA (SEE/KSEE) |  |
sub |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 12-Apr-2025 16:00 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 12-Apr-2025 16:17 | ASN | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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