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| Date: | Wednesday 26 June 1996 |
| Time: | 06:50 |
| Type: |  Boeing 737-436 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-DOCR |
| MSN: | 25851/2387 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1992 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-3 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 143 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | Near Copenhagen -
 Denmark
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | København-Kastrup Airport (CPH/EKCH) |
| London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was operating a scheduled passenger service from Copenhagen to London Gatwick
Airport. About six minutes after departure from Copenhagen, the flight crew noted that the
cabin pressurization system (AUTO mode) was producing a fluctuating cabin rate of climb. On
passing FL150, in order to reduce the amount of fluctuation, the STANDBY system rate selector
was set at the minimum (DECR) setting and the pressurization mode selector switched to STBY. At
this point, all cabin pressure was lost and the cabin altitude warning horn began to sound,
indicating that the cabin altitude had exceeded 10,000 feet. Immediate deselection of AUTO mode
had no effect. The flight crew donned their oxygen masks, advised ATC of the situation and
initiated a rapid descent to FL100, in accordance with the operator's Quick Reference Handbook
(QRH). The passenger oxygen system automatically deployed the masks in the cabin, this system
being designed to operate at a cabin altitude of 14,000 feet.
Once level at FL100, the flight crew found that selection of AUTO mode regained control of the
cabin pressure. Re-selection of STBY mode again caused the cabin altitude to increase rapidly, so
the controller was left in AUTO. A further climb was initiated to FL150 but the fault recurred.
Another rapid descent was initiated, this time to FL90. The aircraft then returned to land
uneventfully at Copenhagen. During the second rapid descent, the commander's Electronic Attitude
Director Indicator (EADI) blanked completely. A subsequent attempt to start the APU in flight was
unsuccessful and after a short period the EADI returned to normal.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ef67ed915d1374000293/dft_avsafety_pdf_501870.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/10488445 (Photo)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 14-Apr-2025 15:00 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 14-Apr-2025 15:00 | ASN | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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