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| Date: | Monday 18 November 1996 |
| Time: | 13:47 |
| Type: |  British Aerospace BAe-146-200QC |
| Owner/operator: | Titan Airways |
| Registration: | G-ZAPK |
| MSN: | E2148 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 52 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | London-City Airport (LCY/EGLC) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Dublin Airport (DUB/EIDW) |
| London-City Airport (LCY/EGLC) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was being operated on a sector from Dublin to London City; the commander was the
handling pilot. Just after 1344 hrs, the aircraft began a coupled ILS approach, from 3,000 feet,
to Runway 28; the weather was CAVOK, the surface wind was 325°/10kt and the runway was dry.
The crew could not recall what VREF they had used, however, as the landing weight was about
31,260 kg the correct value would have been 109 kt. The command speed pointer(bug) on the ASI
was set to VREF+5 kt, the recommended approach speed. The first officer recalled that the speed
during the initial part of the approach was "bug+10kt" (VREF+15 kt). He drew the
commander’s attention to this and received an acknowledgement. He noted that, as the aircraft
crossed the threshold, the speed was about "bug+7kt" (VREF+12 kt).
It was not clear where the aircraft touched down, but when it did it appeared to both pilots to be
normal and the commander selected the engines to ground idle. He then selected the lift spoilers and
applied the brakes but there was little retardation and he felt that the aircraft was "skating on glass".
He said that he called "no brakes" and shortly afterwards the first officer called "no spoilers". The
first officer noticed that there were no spoiler captions on the annunciator panel and the 'Lift Spoiler'
warning on the glare shield was not illuminated.
When the commander recycled the spoiler lever the lift spoilers deployed. Almost immediately, he
felt normal braking and the aircraft started to decelerate rapidly; the first officer was by now also
applying pressure to the brake pedals.
The ATC controller had not noticed the initial part of the landing but he reported that the aircraft
finally touched down between 1/3 and 1/2 way along the runway, nose wheel first. There was a
considerable amount of "smoke" evident from the area where the main wheels touched. The
controller, anticipating an overrun, pressed the crash alarm.
At about 1347 hrs, the aircraft came to a halt at the end of the starter extension to Runway 10. The
controller told the AFS that he suspected a burst tyre and asked them to investigate and report.
Shortly afterwards the crew asked the controller if there was any sign of fire. At the request of the
AFS, the commander shutdown the engines and awaited an inspection.
At 1400 hrs, in the absence of any evidence of fire or tyre damage, the decision was made to restart
the engines and to taxi to the stand. The commander checked the spoilers and they deployed
normally consequently, after consulting the ground engineer, he decided that it was probably a "one
off" problem and the aircraft and crew continued with their schedule.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/542304b1e5274a1317000cbf/dft_avsafety_pdf_500333.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/164111 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 16 June 1990 | G-PRIN | Princess Air | 0 | Jersey Airport, Channel Islands (JER/EGJJ) | |
sub |
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 14-Apr-2025 18:18 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 14-Apr-2025 18:20 | ASN | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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