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| Date: | Friday 6 December 1996 |
| Time: | 03:22 |
| Type: |  Boeing 767-336ER |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-BNWM |
| MSN: | 25204/376 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1991 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 166 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | Over the North Atlantic Ocean -
 Atlantic Ocean
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Pittsburgh International Airport, PA (PIT/KPIT) |
| London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The crew had operated the outbound sector from London Gatwick to Pittsburgh (USA) during the
day of 4 December, arriving at about 2040 hrs (1540 hrs local time). The rest period in Pittsburgh
was in excess of 24 hours, during which the First Officer (F/O) consumed only a light diet. He felt
rested and fit to operate the return sector.
The aircraft departed from Pittsburgh at 2332 hrs (1832 hrs local time, 5 December) on the return
sector to Gatwick. The aircraft was equipped for Extended Range Twin Engine Operations (ETOPS)
over water with a 180 minute en routediversion validation and all of the relevant aircraft
systems were serviceable. The planned flight time was 6 hours 54 minutes and an additional four
tonnes of fuel was being carried in view of the forecast fog expected at Gatwick at the planned
arrival time. The nominated en route alternates (ERAs) on the Flight Plan were Halifax (Nova
Scotia, Canada), Keflavik (Iceland) and Paris CDG (France). The Flight Plan primary landing
alternate airfield was Prestwick and the secondary alternate Paris CDG. The handling pilot for the
cruise phase was the F/O and the right autopilot and the auto throttle systems were engaged.
During the flight, the F/O began to feel some discomfort and took two tablets of what he
believed were normal strength Paracetamol type painkillers at about 0200hrs. He then consumed a
light meal. About 20 minutes later, he began to feel light headed and nauseous. He excused
himself from the flight deck and went to the toilet. He collapsed in the toilet, but came round a few
minutes later. On returning to the flight deck, he informed the commander of his situation. The
nausea and sickness continued so he lay down in a comfortable position on the floor of the flight
deck, where he remained for some considerable time. Aid was administered by the cabin staff. The
F/O and the commander had consumed different menu items inaccordance with the operator's
normal practice and the commander considered that the F/O's sickness was due the consumption
of the meal.
The aircraft passed the waypoints 'STEAM' at 0205 hrs, 55°N/50°W at 0240 hrs and 56°N/40°W at
0322 hrs. The ETOPS Progress Chart for the flight showed that the ETOPS ERA changed from
Halifax to Keflavik at 0257 hrs. The weather conditions at both of these alternates were
good throughout the relevant periods of the flight. The commander stated that he elected to continue the flight towards the UK as he considered it safer than a diversion as it was night time and the alternate landing sites would have been unfamiliar. The aircraft was performing normally and the
flight continued uneventfully towards the UK. Communications with Oceanic ATC were conducted as normal using the HF radio. The commander elected not to inform ATC of the incapacitation at this stage as he considered that there was little assistance they could offer.
The commander monitored the weather as the flight continued. A record of the weather at several
major UK airports at 0450 hrs was recorded on the flight log. Fog was being reported at Gatwick and
an RVR for Runway 26L of 450 meters was annotated on the flight log along with the METAR
information. Manchester and Glasgow were also reporting fog. London Heathrow was reporting a
visibility of 3,000 meters in mist with overcast cloud base 400 feet. Prestwick, Belfast, Shannon and
Dublin all had good weather conditions with visibilities in excess of 10km.
At 0539 hrs, the aircraft was transferred to the control of London ATCC Area Control, VHF
frequency 133.6 MHz, while at FL350 on course to 'GIBSO' reporting point. The flight was cleared
from 'GIBSO' on a 'WILLO 1D' Standard Arrival Route towards Gatwick. The commander did not
inform ATC of the medical incapacitation at this stage, but at 0544 hrs he requested permission to
leave the frequency for a few minutes in order to call company operations. This permission was
granted by the controller. Medical assistance on arrival at Gatwick was then requested on the
company frequency. The aircraft passed Strumble VOR at 0547 hrs and the commander returned to
the Area Control frequency at 0550 hrs. A touchdown RVR of 800 metres at Gatwick was
broadcast by the controller at this time, but no reference was made as to the runway in use. Descent
clearance was issued at 0556 hrs and the initial descent was commenced at 0559 hrs.
The F/O still felt light headed, but returned to his seat during the latter stages of the descent. The
Cabin Service Director occupied the supernumerary seat in order to offer assistance to the
commander and to tend to the F/O. The F/O played no active part in the approach, although certain
aspects of the weather and type of approach had been discussed with the commander.
The flight was transferred to two other control sectors as it descended. At 0608 hrs, it was
requested to reduce to holding speed and to route direct towards 'HOLLY' for sequencing. 'HOLLY'
is the entry point of the holding fix for Gatwick for aircraft arriving from the west. The
controller informed the commander that the aircraft was number five in the landing sequence. On
transfer to Terminal Control, Gatwick Intermediate Director, frequency 126.825 MHz at 0612 hrs,
the commander checked in with the passing and cleared flight levels and informed the controller that
the aircraft was a "Boeing 767, with the information". This was a reference to having copied the
ATIS information for Gatwick broadcast on VHF frequency 121.025 MHz. It is normal practice for
crews to report the particular code letter associated with the ATIS broadcast, in order that the
controller may confirm that the latest update has been obtained. In this case, the code letter was not
transmitted by the commander. The controller therefore replied that the current ATIS
information was 'C' and that the QNH was 1019 mb. At this stage, the commander advised ATC that
there was a medical emergency on board "which happens to be the First Officer, so it would be
appreciated if we didn't have to go round the hold and if you could give us some assistance coming
in". The controller did not respond to this request directly, but continued to vector a
preceding aircraft onto the ILS for Runway 08R. The fact that Runway 08R was being used was
mentioned three times during transmissions between ATC and the preceding aircraft. The Boeing
767 was then transferred to the Gatwick Final Director at 0614 hrs, frequency 118.95 MHz.
On transfer, the Boeing 767 was heading north and descending to 4,000 feet. The controller stated
that the aircraft had 23 nm to touchdown and enquired as to whether the aircraft would be "OK to
handle a Cat 3". The commander responded by asking if the visibility was still 600 meters. He was
informed that the RVRs had increased to 1,300 meters touchdown and greater than 1,500 meters for
mid point and stop end, with a cloud report of overcast below 100 feet. The commander replied that
he was intending to make an approach under those conditions. The commander reported that his
speed was 230kt and the controller turned the aircraft right onto a heading of 050°. Further descent
was instructed down to 3,000 feet on the QNH 1019 mb.
At 0615 hrs, the controller advised that the aircraft had 3 nm to run to the localizer. At this stage, the
commander enquired if the Runway in use was 08R. He was informed that this was correct and
confirmed that it had 3 nm to run to the localizer and 15 nm to touchdown. The commander
apologized as he had understood it to be Runway 26L in use and requested a "delaying tactic". A left
orbit was given, to roll out on a heading of 050°. The aircraft was about to fly outside regulated
airspace during the orbit so the controller requested that the descent be stopped at 4,000 feet. He
also asked if the commander was flying the aircraft by himself, to which the reply was in the
affirmative. The aircraft was leveled off at 4,000 feet and the speed was reduced in order to
configure for the approach. This gave the commander the necessary time to reprogram the Flight
Management System (FMS) and to set up the appropriate navigation aids for the approach.
The ILS at Gatwick radiates on the same frequency (110.9 MHz) for both Runways 26L and 08R,
although only one system is active at any given time. However, when Runway 26L is in use
(inbound course 262°M) the morse identifier transmitter from the facility is 'I-WW' and when
Runway 08R is in use (inbound course 082°M) the identifier transmitted is 'I-GG'.
Descent to 3,000 feet followed once the aircraft had become established on the Localizer for
Runway 08R and a normal glide-path capture occurred. The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR)
indicated that all three autopilot systems were engaged for the coupled approach and an uneventful
auto-land ensued at 0625 hrs. The surface wind was from 030° less than 5kt and all RVRs were in
excess of 1,500 meters. The commander indicated that the runway had become visible at 200 feet
above ground level. The aircraft remained on Gatwick Director frequency until after landing, when it
was transferred to the Gatwick Ground Control frequency.
After landing, the aircraft taxied to a North Terminal parking stand where the passengers
deplaned normally. After the passengers had disembarked, the First Officer was able to walk to the
waiting ambulance which took him to the Port Health Authority centre. He was examined by
doctors and transport was arranged to take him home some six hours later, once he had recovered.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f27040f0b613420003a5/dft_avsafety_pdf_501353.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/11172969 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 18 October 1999 | G-BNWM | British Airways | 0 | London Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) |  |
min |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 14-Apr-2025 18:18 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 14-Apr-2025 18:19 | ASN | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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