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| Date: | Tuesday 19 September 1995 |
| Time: | 12:39 |
| Type: |  Airbus A340-311 |
| Owner/operator: | Virgin Atlantic Airways |
| Registration: | G-VBUS |
| MSN: | 013 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1993 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-5C2 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 264 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor, repaired |
| Location: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was loaded almost to the maximum structural take-off weight for a 12 hour scheduled
flight. The pushback, engine start and taxi phases of the flight were normal except for a transient fault within number one primary flight control computer. This fault was subsequently cleared and no other faults of significance were indicated to the flight crew on the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring) displays.
The ATIS broadcast weather conditions for takeoff were: QNH 1017 HPa, temperature 16°C, visibility
9 km and overcast cloud at 1,600 feet; the average wind was 020°/11 kt with the direction varying
between 330° and 060°. Although the airline's fleet policy was normally to use CONFIG 2 (24° slat
and 22° flap) for departures which were not climb performance limited, on this occasion the
commander decided to takeoff in CONFIG 1+F (21° slat and 17° flap) for training purposes with the
first officer handling. The flight crew opted to takeoff with reduced engine power by using a FLEX
temperature of 38°C and assuming no headwind component. The scheduled speeds were: V1 144 kt,
VR 153 kt and V2 160 kt. For performance purposes these figures were valid for a take-off weight of
258.2 tonnes which was 1.8 tonnes more than the calculated take-off weight given in the loadsheet,
and above the structural limit of 257 tonnes.
The flight was cleared to takeoff and informed that the surface wind was 030°/12 kt. Initially the
take-off roll proceeded normally. The first officer applied nose down sidestick with negligible into-
wind sidestick and he relaxed the forward pressure at about 100 KIAS. As the airspeed approached
VR, the trend became slightly erratic due to the varying crosswind and the commander inadvertently
called "rotate" about one second early (149 KIAS). At the same time the first officer, who noticed the
commander's slightly early call, applied gentle back stick pressure followed by almost full back stick
as the IAS reached VR. The nose gear lifted off the runway during the next second and the first officer
continued the rotation manoeuvre at a rate which he considered to be slightly less than 3°/sec. As the aircraft rotated, he also applied a little more than half into-wind sidestick to oppose the tendency of the aircraft to roll to the right due to the crosswind from the left. During this phase the flight deck crew felt the aircraft jerk laterally and the cabin crew at the rear of the aircraft heard and felt the underside of the fuselage touch the runway.
Within seconds of becoming airborne, the flight crew were informed by ATC that the aircraft had
scraped its tail on takeoff. The commander acknowledged the report and the aircraft continued with the standard instrument departure but unpressurised and not above 6,000 feet altitude. Once over the sea, the crew attempted to jettison fuel down to maximum landing weight before returning to Heathrow. However, despite exhaustive efforts and technical advice from the company's engineers, fuel could not be jettisoned. Meanwhile, conditions in the passenger cabin were becoming hot and stuffy so the commander decided to use ram air to condition the cabin. This was only partially successful and faced with the choice of landing overweight or burning off fuel for 10 hours, the commander decided to return to Heathrow where conditions were suitable for the overweight landing. He took control from the first officer for the approach and landed softly on Runway 09L at 1402 hrs from a CONFIG 3 approach using a final approach speed of 163 kt. Full reverse thrust and pedal braking were employed to decelerate the aircraft with the intention of using most of the runway length. The fire service were waiting and attended the aircraft which was able to taxi to the Terminal. The aircraft suffered substantial damage.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422eb2bed915d1374000063/Airbus_A340-311__G-VBUS_02-96.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/11379434 (Photo)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 15-Apr-2025 13:09 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 15-Apr-2025 13:11 | ASN | Updated [Damage, Accident report, ] |
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