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| Date: | Thursday 7 December 1995 |
| Time: | 07:35 |
| Type: |  Boeing 767-336ER |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-BNWP |
| MSN: | 25443/419 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1992 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 169 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Location: | 37 NM from Beirut, Over Waypoint CHEKKA -
 Lebanon
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY/OLBA) |
| London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The crew had arrived in Amman, Jordan two days previously and had spent two days rest period
there. The first officer was to be the handling pilot (HP) for both of there turn sectors to London
Heathrow Airport and the first, from Amman to Beirut, was uneventful. There is a Route Clearance
Unit brief for Beirut and the commander had been to Beirut before but the first officer had not.
For the departure from Beirut, in line with normal procedure, the commander, as non-handling pilot
(NHP), set up the Flight Management System (FMS). The FMS requires a SID (or an ATC cleared
'Direct To') to be entered and so, as there was no published alternative to the (eastbound) 'BEIRUT1'
SID and no other clearance had been issued by ATC or suggested in the departure publications on
the aircraft, the commander programmed the SID into it. It was discussed between the crew that this
would be amended immediately that they were cleared to make a direct track to BALMA; after take-
off if necessary.
The Aerad 'Special Procedures', under the heading 'Departures', require that flights which cannot
comply with the published departure must inform ATC on 'start-up'. Whilst the Lebanese Air Pilot's
authoritative description of the departure instructions requires that the appropriate airway should be
intercepted by a direct track unless otherwise instructed by ATC, the Aerad chart in use by the crew
did not state this. This omission has since been rectified.
The aircraft left the stand at 0700 hrs and during the taxiing, at 0705 hrs, ATC issued the departure
clearance "CLEAR TO LONDON AIRPORT VIA B15FLIGHT PLANNED ROUTE CLIMB AND MAINTAIN
INITIALLY FLIGHT LEVEL 240 REQUEST LEVEL CHANGE ON ROUTE AND SQUAWK A 4252". This was
read back correctly and discussed by the crew but, as it did not include either the word 'BALMA' or
the word 'Direct', they did not realize that it constituted a 'Direct to BALMA' departure clearance and,
therefore, did not reprogram the FMS. This clearance did not mention the BEIRUT1 SID.
The flight took off from Runway 21 at 0708hrs and, following the required return to Beirut beacon,
followed the SID towards 'CHEKKA'. At 0710 hrs, the commander asked ATC to confirm that the
flight was cleared to climb to Flight Level (FL) 240. This was confirmed and he was told to report
reaching that level and passing BALMA. The commander did not ask either for confirmation of the
SID route or for re-clearance direct to BALMA.
Beirut Radar was unserviceable and, at 0718hrs, ATC asked for the aircraft's ETA for
BALMA, which the commander gave as 0734 hrs. The direct track from Beirut to BALMA is 41 nm,
and the controller, therefore, requested confirmation of this ETA, which was given. The distance
from Beirut via CHEKKA and LEBOR to BALMA, which would have been displayed on the FMS,
would have been about 165 nm and it would have been displaying an ETA of 0724 hrs.The
controller then asked for further verification of the estimate and for their range from Beirut. The
commander stated that they were overhead CHEKKA and, giving the range from Beirut as 37 nm, was
asked for the radial from Beirut. The commander replied that the radial was 212°, which was 180° in
error, and was instructed to proceed to BALMA. There followed a series of requests by ATC for
radials and distances from other local radio beacons, as the controller tried to establish the position
of the aircraft. About one minute later, ATC instructed the aircraft to "IMMEDIATELY TURN LEFT
WESTERLY HEADING LEFT LEFT"and asked "WHAT'S YOUR LEVEL?". The commander
acknowledged this instruction and the first officer turned the aircraft left onto a heading of 270°.
Following further confirmation of radials and distances from Beirut, the controller informed
the commander that they were flying over a prohibited area and on a different airway (R 655) from
that in their clearance. The prohibited area in question was no longer operative. The
commander replied that they had exactly followed the controller's instruction to turn left onto 270°.
The flight to London was continued without further incident and the commander did not consider
that the event was significant enough to file a report to the operating company on the matter.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ef02ed915d137400025d/dft_avsafety_pdf_500080.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/7593989 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 10 June 2023 | N700KW | Eastern Airlines | 0 | Santa Maria Public Airport, CA (SMX/KSMX) |  |
non |
| Taxiway excursion | ||||||
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 15-Apr-2025 17:24 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 15-Apr-2025 17:25 | ASN | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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