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| Date: | Thursday 29 June 1995 |
| Time: | 08:13 LT |
| Type: |  Boeing 757-236 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-BIKZ |
| MSN: | 23532/98 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1986 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Oslo-Fornebu Airport (FBU/ENFB) -
 Norway
|
| Phase: | Taxi |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Oslo-Fornebu Airport (FBU/ENFB) |
| London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) | |
| Investigating agency: | NSIA |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
At 08.02 hours BAW 761 called ground control (GND) at Fornebu from parking area 38 (see map), and requested clearance to taxi out for a flight to London. BAW 761 was given permission to start taxiing out. The crew were at the same time informed that there would be a change in runway, and that they were to use runway 06 instead of runway 24.
At 08.06 hours SOR 24 called Fornebu GND from the GA ("general aviation") terminal and requested clearance to start for a flight to Stord, departing from runway 19.
At 08.10 hours SOR 24 received its en-route clearance for the flight to Stord, and was at the same time instructed to taxi to holding point and then contact Fornebu control tower (TWR). Immediately after this the BAW 761 crew requested taxiing instructions, where-upon they were instructed to cross runway 01 and taxi to holding point runway 06. The TWR air traffic controller on duty states in his report that when SOR 24 lined up on runway 19 ready for departure, the GND air traffic controller was informed of this. SOR 24 was cleared for take-off at 08.12 hours. The GND air traffic controller tried twice to contact the BAW 761 crew to instruct them to cross runway 01/19 behind SOR 24, which was
then in the process of taking off, but received no answer.
The BAW 761 crew then called Fornebu GND and asked if the last transmission from the GND air traffic controller had been meant for them. The air traffic controller replied in the affirmative and said that the aircraft (SOR 24) had now taken off and that they could just carry on crossing runway 01/19. Both the TWR and the GND air traffic controllers state in their reports that the conflict was monitored visually and that it had been decided that it was unnecessary to cancel SOR 24's clearance for take-off because of the distance BAW 761 still had to taxi prior to crossing the runway. The TWR and the GND air traffic controllers also state in their report that SOR 24 was in the air and was passing over taxiway E as BAW 761 was going past position No. 47, approximately 125 m. from the stop line
and approximately 185 m. from the edge of runway 01/19.
BAW 761's Pilot-in-Command states in his report that just before crossing runway 01/19 they saw a twin-engine aircraft coming into view behind and to the right of them and pass in front of them approximately 40-50 m. away. The aircraft passed by just as they were checking whether the runway was clear for crossing. Air traffic control claimed that they had called them, but neither the Pilot-in-Command nor the co-pilot had heard it. The Pilot-in-Command states finally that the air traffic controller had a strong accent, and that could have been the reason why they did not understand that the transmissions were meant for them.
The chief air traffic controller at Fornebu TWR states in his report that the crossing of runway 01/19 with respect to departures from runway 06 and landings on runway 24 is an area in which the number of conflicts is at the highest at Fornebu. There are approximately 200 crossings per day made at this point, so air traffic controllers are very aware of this problem, and have devised a good operational routine between them to deal with the situation. To reduce the volume of radiotelephony (RT), which is usually quite considerable at Fornebu, the decision is often made to give aircraft permission to cross the runway as early as the time at which clearance is given to taxi. This is also related to the fact that traffic which is due to take off from runway 19 has to be slotted in with the traffic flow on
main runway 06/24, and it is usually the case that a decision as to when this traffic is to take off is not made a long time in advance. It is thus assumed that aircraft which have already received clearance to cross the runway will be given a revised clearance, either to stop before they reach runway 01/19 or to cross behind the aircraft taking off, as was what happened in this case. What was regrettable on this occasion was that BAW 761 did not adequately monitor the frequency and therefore did not comprehend the revised clearance. SOR 24 was allowed to continue the take off anyway, as the air traffic controllers on duty considered that the safety margins were adequate for SOR 24 to be able to pass the crossing point between taxiway E and runway 19 before BAW 761 could have possibly reached the crossing point.
Accident investigation:
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Sources:
https://nsia.no/g-bikz-ln-aah-eng-pdf?lcid=1033&pid=Native-ContentFile-File&attach=1
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/7743198 (Photo)
Revision history:
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