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| Date: | Thursday 31 October 1991 |
| Time: | 13:27 LT |
| Type: |  Douglas DC-8-55 (F) |
| Owner/operator: | Affretair |
| Registration: | Z-WSB |
| MSN: | 45805/244 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1965 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 5 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Take off |
| Nature: | Cargo |
| Departure airport: | London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) |
| Harare-Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport (HRE/FVRG) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On the day before the incident the aircraft flew uneventfully from Amsterdam to Gatwick. At Gatwick
it was prepared for a non-stop cargo flight to Zimbabwe which was to be flown by a crew that had
been resting at Gatwick for three days prior to the incident. Two other members of the operating
company were on board as supernumary crew on this flight. The take-off weight was 141.2 tonnes
which was 4.9 tonnes below the performance take-off weight limit and the aircraft's centre of gravity
was well within the permitted range for its loaded weight. On preparing the aircraft for flight, the
operating flight crew of three (commander, first officer and flight engineer) discovered that the flight
control gust locks were not engaged. They were unable to re-engage the locks because the aircraft was parked with its tail into a strong southerly wind but the flight controls appeared to be undamaged. Apart from the unlocked controls, preparations for flight continued normally and the aircraft taxied for runway 26L. Normal 'full and free' flight control checks were carried out whilst taxiing and the aircraft was configured for a 15° flap take-off. Decision speed (V1) was calculated to be 138 knots; rotation speed (Vr) was to be 155 knots and the crosswind limit for take-off was 25 knots.
The commander, who was the handling pilot, lined up for take-off and the flight engineer advanced the throttles to above 1.50 EPR (engine pressure ratio) which armed the take-off configuration warning system. The warning horn sounded and so the commander abandoned the take-off from minimal forward speed. After informing ATC of his predicament he taxied clear of the runway at the first exit and the investigated the cause of the configuration warning which, on this aircraft, could be triggered only by the parking brake, incorrect flap or spoiler deployment. The crew checked that the flaps were at 15° and that the inboard spoilers were locked closed. Finding nothing amiss, the commander ordered that the engines be advanced to 1.50 EPR once again. This time the configuration warning horn did not sound and he decided to attempt another take-off.
At 1326 hrs the aircraft was again cleared for take-off and, initially, the take-off run commenced
normally. However, as power on numbers 1, 3 and 4 engines increased to the target of 1.88 EPR the
flight engineer observed that the no. 2 engine EPR was excessive. He called out "EPR" which was
acknowledged with a call of "OK", retarded the no. 2 throttle and compared the no. 2 engine
indications with readings from the other engines. From this comparison he suspected that the no. 2
engine EPR reading was defective. He advanced the throttle to match the no. 2 N1 RPM reading with
that of the other engines. With the Nls matched, the no. 2 engine N2 RPM and EGT readings were
similar to those of the other engines. On that basis the flight engineer did not call for the take-off to be abandoned because he was satisfied that no. 2 engine was producing take-off thrust.
Meanwhile the commander, who was controlling the aircraft by rudder and nose-wheel steering,
perceived that the amount of directional control required to keep the aircraft aligned with the runway was significantly more than he considered appropriate for the reported crosswind. At about 100 knots he released the nose-wheel steering and took control of the elevators and ailerons from the first officer. Shortly afterwards, when he attempted to raise the nosewheel clear of the runway, he perceived that the aircraft's response to elevator control inputs was abnormal and that the amount of left rudder was excessive for the prevailing conditions. He decided to abandon the take-off and initiated the appropriate drills by calling "stop". The drills were actioned by all three crew members and the aircraft decelerated rapidly from its peak airspeed of between 135 and 140 kt. No RTF call of abandoning the take-off was received by the air controller but he saw smoke issuing from the DC-8's landing gear and speedily instructed traffic on finals to go-around. At about the same time the ATC watch manager initiated emergency action since, at that stage, it seemed probable that the aircraft would over-run the runway.
The commander was able safely to vacate the runway via the last high-speed exit and bring the aircraft to rest on the standby runway (26R). The fire section attended the aircraft which was chocked in-situ whilst the wheelbrakes cooled; during this process two tyres on the left main gear deflated when fusible plugs melted. After the wheels had cooled to a safe temperature, two deflated tyres were replaced and the aircraft was towed to the cargo area for a full check of the wheels and flight control systems.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ecbae5274a1314000121/Douglas_DC-8-55F__Z-WSB_02-92.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/7265320 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 28 January 1996 | Z-WSB | Affretair | 0 | Harare Airport (HRE) |  |
w/o |
| Runway excursion | ||||||
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 24-May-2025 18:43 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 24-May-2025 18:44 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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