| Date: | Wednesday 12 February 2025 |
| Time: | 09:40 UTC |
| Type: | Canadair CRJ-100ER |
| Owner/operator: | CemAir |
| Registration: | ZS-CMK |
| MSN: | 7292 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1999 |
| Engine model: | GE CF34-3A1 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 35 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Johannesburg-O.R. Tambo International Airport (JNB/FAOR) -
South Africa
|
| Phase: | Standing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Johannesburg-O.R. Tambo International Airport (JNB/FAOR) |
| Destination airport: | Victoria Falls Airport (VFA/FVFA) |
| Investigating agency: | CAA S.A. |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:At 0815Z, the captain (CPT), who was the pilot flying (PF), attended the pre-flight briefing before proceeding to the airport parking bays for a scheduled 0930Z flight. Whilst en route to the parking bays, he was informed that the aircraft was at the hangar due to a radio defect encountered earlier on the day. After contacting maintenance, the CPT was advised that the aircraft was being towed to parking bay C16. Upon arrival at C16 at 0850Z, the aircraft was yet to be delivered; it was only received at 0900Z. After liaising with the ramp agent (RA), the CPT conducted the pre-flight
inspection in which he identified that there was insufficient fuel in the aircraft. He then requested fuel which arrived at 0909Z where upon refuelling commenced concurrently with passenger boarding. The CPT boarded the aircraft to configure the flight deck and conduct pre-flight briefings with the first officer (FO). The FAOR ground control issued a calculated take-off time (CTOT) of 0933Z.
At 0930Z, the CPT queried the RA regarding the nose landing gear doors which remained open. The RA responded that they would be closed post-refuelling. Refuelling was completed at 0933Z and the CPT signed the fuel slip. The cockpit warning system still displayed the nose gear doors as open; this prompted the CPT to disembark from the aircraft to verify with the RA. Meanwhile, the refuelling agent removed the grounding cable from the nose landing gear whilst he secured the refuelling rig. After disembarking, the CPT noticed a white minibus near the bay; the RA explained that the refuelling personnel were conducting an audit. After the RA had closed the doors, the CPT instructed the RA to expedite the process before he boarded the aircraft to continue with the engine start checks. Meanwhile, the minibus departed as the CPT returned to the cockpit.
During this time, the refuelling agent was retracting the bowser's stabiliser in preparation for departure. The CPT initiated engine start-up, beginning with Engine No. 2 (starboard/right) followed by Engine No. 1 (port/left). At 0934Z, the CPT instructed the RA to remove the chocks which were repositioned to the left of Bay C16. The crew proceeded with after-start and flight control checks before requesting a clearance signal. The FO observed the CPT giving a thumbs-up but was unable to locate the RA for confirmation. The crew requested taxi clearance from FAOR ground control and were instructed to proceed after two Airlink aircraft had cleared the area.
At 0935Z, after confirming 'no obstructions', the CPT announced, 'clear left,' and the FO responded, 'clear right.' The FO focused on passing aircraft and ground traffic on the right-side but did not check beyond his shoulder, thus, limiting his view of the refuelling bowser. The aircraft impacted the fuel bowser.
The close circuit television (CCTV) footage captured the following sequence of events: After chock removal, the RA did not issue the final 'All clear to go' signal. He proceeded to the bowser to verify the ongoing delays and observed the stabiliser still being retracted.
During the interview, the RA stated that whilst he was preparing to signal the crew, the aircraft began to move forward, and it impacted the fuel bowser. At 0936Z, the CCTV recorded the RA and the refuelling personnel standing between the wing and the bowser. As the aircraft advanced, both individuals ran to safety before impact. The aircraft sustained substantial damage to the outer leading edge of the right-wing; the bowser incurred damage to its control panel and refuelling rig. No person was injured on-board the aircraft and on the ground.
Probable Cause(s)
The aircraft impacted the refuelling bowser after it had advanced before receiving a clearance signal from the ramp agent.
Contributing Factor(s)
- Delays relating to aircraft delivery shortened pre-flight preparation.
- Simultaneous refuelling, boarding and flight deck setup increased workload.
- Miscommunication between the flight crew and RA regarding taxi clearance.
- FO's limited scanning of obstacles on the right side of the aircraft caused him to miss to identify the refuelling bowser.
- CPT deviated from refuelling SOPs to save time.
Accident investigation:
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|
| | |
| Investigating agency: | CAA S.A. |
| Report number: | CA18//3/2/1471 |
| Status: | Investigation completed |
| Duration: | 4 months |
| Download report: | Final report
|
|
Sources:
SACAA
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 17 January 2004 |
N595SW |
Skywest Airlines |
0 |
Rapid City Regional Airport, SD (RAP/KRAP) |
 |
min |
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
| 24-Jun-2025 13:47 |
ASN |
Added |
| 24-Jun-2025 13:51 |
ASN |
Updated [Aircraft type, Operator, Total occupants, Location, Phase, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Narrative, ] |
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