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| Date: | Wednesday 24 November 1993 |
| Time: | c. 02:40 LT |
| Type: |  Shorts 330-200 |
| Owner/operator: | Titan Airways |
| Registration: | G-ZAPC |
| MSN: | SH3023 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 3 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Norwich International Airport (NWI/EGSH) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Cargo |
| Departure airport: | Nottingham-East Midlands Airport (EMA/EGNX) |
| Norwich International Airport (NWI/EGSH) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft, callsign ZAP 306A, departed East Midlands Airport at about 2345 hrs for a flight to
Norwich Airport. On rotation, both 'HYD L' and 'HYD R' central warning panel (CWP) captions
illuminated briefly and then went out. The landing gear was left extended until a check of the hydraulic services panel had been made. However, indications were normal and so the landing gear was retracted and the flight continued.
About 15 minutes later, when the aircraft was in the cruise, the 'HYD L' CWP caption again illuminated. The hydraulic pressure was normal and the contents gauge indicated halfway between the amber sector and the white full mark; in accordance with the emergency checklist, the left pump inlet valve was selected 'SHUT'.
At 0003 hrs the aircraft, which was then 58 nm from the airfield at FL55, called Norwich Approach
and passed an ETA of 0022 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to 3,000 feet for an ILS approach to
Runway 27. At some stage, in order to minimise damage, the left pump inlet valve was selected to
'OPEN' to lubricate the hydraulic pump; the 'HYD L' CWP caption went out. At 0029 hrs, the
aircraft was established on the localizer and, in anticipation of a possible problem, flap 8° and landing gear were selected early. When landing gear was selected down, both 'HYD L' and 'HYD R' CWP
captions illuminated. The crew noted the following:
a) The nose landing gear indicator was red
b) The right main gear indicator was red
c) The left main gear indicator was not illuminated
d) The flap indicator read 0°
e) The main system hydraulic pressure gauge read zero
f) The hydraulic contents gauge read just below ful
The approach controller was informed that there was a problem with the landing gear and that the
missed approach procedure would be carried out. The aircraft was cleared to 2,000 feet and the
missed approach was initiated at 0033 hrs.
The emergency checklist required that, if both 'HYD L' and 'HYD R' CWP captions were on, and
there was a low reading on the main system pressure with contents normal, then both pump inlet
valves should be selected to 'SHUT' and the emergency systems should be used. The landing normal
gear selector was left in the 'DOWN' position and 'LANDING GEAR DOWN EMERGENCY' lever
was pulled. This action produced no change in the landing gear indications, but the 'EMERGENCY
LANDING GEAR' accumulator pressure gauge showed an immediate reduction from 3,000 psi to
1,200 psi, the discharged state pressure. The hydraulic contents indication remained at just below full.
At 0053 hrs, the controller was asked if there were any airfields available with a 'foam carpet' facility.
He replied that he did not think that the facility still existed. At 0100 hrs, the aircraft flew past the
terminal area and observers confirmed that the nose landing gear was partially extended, but the main gear was retracted. The aircraft again entered the holding pattern at 3,000 feet, in order to reduce the fuel load, and to make further attempts to resolve the problem, in addition to planning the approach. Not being entirely certain of the landing gear position and its effect on the aircraft's performance, the commander decided to carry out a low speed handling check to establish a safe approach speed.
At 0122 hrs, the controller confirmed that there were no airfields available with a foam carpet facility and so the commander elected to make the landing at Norwich Airport. All loose articles were
removed from the flight deck and stowed under the cargo net. When the crash axe was checked, it
was found that the belt and buckle stowage arrangement was extremely tight and that the axe could not easily be removed. It was therefore slackened in preparation for the landing. The third crew member was briefed on the emergency and occupied a seat at the rear of the aircraft.
At 0210 hrs, the aircraft passed an expected approach time of 0240 hrs. However, at 0226 hrs the
controller passed the information that shallow fog had started to form. The fuel load had reduced to
about 300 lb and the aircraft started the outbound leg of the approach at 0231 hrs, with the commander handling. The aircraft established on the localizer at 0234 hrs and the first officer informed ATC that the third crew member was seated at the rear of the cabin. Both pilots had locked their seat harnesses for the approach and landing.
The approach was carried out without incident and the aircraft was held off the runway for as long as
possible, the commander's intention being to touchdown on the main gear housings at minimum
ground speed and rate of descent, in a nose-high attitude. After a period when the aircraft floated with slow deceleration, just prior to touchdown the first officer selected both fuel levers to 'SHUT OFF'. Touchdown, at 0240 hrs, was on the rear of the main landing gear housings. The rear fuselage also touched, and there was intense airframe vibration. Directional control was better than expected and so the commander decided to hold the nose gear off for as long as possible; when it eventually touched, directional control remained adequate. The aircraft did not decelerate as quickly as expected however and, as it appeared that the engines were still running, he asked the first officer to select reverse thrust. The first officer was unable to depress the reverse gate and retard the throttles with her left hand and, with her seat harness locked, she could not use her right hand. Shortly afterwards, the commander called for the engine low pressure (LP) valves to be shut, but the first officer was unable to move the levers. It was intended that the first officer should select the electrical master switch to 'OFF' shortly before the aircraft came to a halt, however, with her harness locked she was unable to reach the switch.
The aircraft came to a halt about 200 meters before the end of the runway and the occupants vacated the aircraft without injury. The airport and local authority rescue services were immediately on the scene. The right engine was found to be still running and so the commander returned to the flight deck and completed the shutdown drills.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422eb8940f0b61342000085/Shorts_SD3-30__G-ZAPC_09-94.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/11271810 (Photo)
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 26-Jun-2025 14:11 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 26-Jun-2025 14:13 | Justanormalperson | Updated |
| 26-Jun-2025 14:13 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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