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| Date: | Wednesday 26 January 1994 |
| Time: | c. 02:00 LT |
| Type: |  McDonnell Douglas MD-83 |
| Owner/operator: | Airtours International Airways |
| Registration: | G-GMJM |
| MSN: | 49951/1915 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1991 |
| Engine model: | P&W JT8D-200 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 174 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | Northwest France -
 France
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Tenerife-South Airport (TFS/GCTS) |
| Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was operating a return charter flight from Manchester to Tenerife South. The takeoff from Manchester was flown using full power and with engine anti-icing selected 'ON: Just prior to takeoff a cabin crew member stationed at the rear of the aircraft noticed that the noise from the engines appeared to sound slightly different to normal. He alerted the cabin supervisor via the interphone and she in turn decided to advise the commander. When she entered the flight deck however it was apparent that the aircraft was commencing its take-off run. Not wishing to distract the pilots she quickly returned to her seat. After takeoff the supervisor contacted the rear cabin to obtain an update on the situation and was told that the noise had ceased and all appeared normal. The outbound sector continued uneventfully and no further action was taken on the report.
The aircraft departed Tenerife South at 2155 his for the return sector to Manchester. During the initial
climb, passing through FL 230, the commander reported that a slight high frequency vibration
("buzz"), lasting between 20 and 30 seconds, was felt through the rudder pedals and cabin altitude
control wheel. The cabin crew at the rear of the aircraft also noticed a "loud noise and strange
vibration" and reported the fact on the interphone to the cabin supervisor who in turn advised the
commander. The flight deck crew checked al the aircraft systems but these showed no abnormal
indications. The climb was therefore continued to a cruising level of FL 310 and the aircraft proceeded northbound. After informing the flight deck crew the supervisor visited the rear of the cabin to check on the vibration for herself. She reported back to the flight deck and confirmed the initial report. Furthermore throughout the flight she continued to keep the commander informed of conditions at the rear of the cabin.
The vibration through the altitude control wheel continued intermittently and the cabin crew stated that even though the vibration intensity reduced it was still present throughout the cruise. Unsure as to the source of the vibration the commander experimented with the thrust lever positions. This, however, was not conclusive.
At 0026 hrs, as the aircraft approached the Santiago area, the vibration through the rudder pedals
re-occurred though this time it was of a much lower intensity. The commander checked with the cabin crew and they confirmed that they were experiencing vibration at the rear of the cabin. Instrument indications were normal, however, as a precaution, the commander requested a change of route to fly closer to the French coast in case an en route diversion became necessary.
After a discussion with the first officer the commander decided to disconnect the autothrottle and
reduce power to approximately 1.5 engine pressure ratio (EPR) on each engine in turn to see if this had any effect on the vibration. Reduction of power on the left engine had no effect and this was returned to the normal power setting. The vibration ceased, however, when a power reduction to 1.5 EPR was made on the right engine. At the same time the commander also noticed a rapid drop in the right hydraulic quantity from 1 quarts to 6 quarts followed by a RIGHT HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOW and
RUDDER CONTROL MANUAL annunciation on the overhead panel. The abnormal check lists for
HYDRAULIC QUANTITY LOW OR DROPPING and RUDDER CONTROL MANUAL were then carried out.
The commander, who had earlier decided to go to the rear of the aircraft to listen for the vibration
himself, decided now to remain on the flight deck but checked with the cabin staff at the rear to
confirm that the vibration had ceased.
By now the aircraft was under the control of Brest ATC. The commander informed them that the
aircraft was under reduced power and requested a descent to FL 280. High frequency radio contact
was then attempted with the company engineers and operations for advice. Reception however was
poor and as the weather in northern France was marginal, with low cloud and strong winds, the
commander elected to continue towards the UK. (With a failure of the right hydraulic system the
commander was committed to lower the landing gear by gravity using the alternate system. Once
locked down the gear could not be retracted. Any diversion, with the gear locked down, made after an attempted approach in marginal conditions would have had a detrimental effect on fuel consumption which could have caused further problems for the crew.)
As the weather at Manchester and at other airfields in the Midlands was also deteriorating, with the
surface wind close to the aircraft's crosswind limits, the commander decided to divert to London
Gatwick. He advised the cabin supervisor of this and also asked to be informed on any re-occurrence
of vibrations felt in the rear of the cabin.
Further examination of the right hydraulic system indicated that the quantity had now increased to
9 quarts and an attempt was made to re-pressurise the system using the electric auxiliary pump.
Hydraulic quantity however rapidly reduced on pump selection confirming a leak in the right hydraulic
system.
The aircraft was now under the control of London ATC. The commander declared a state of URGENCY
(PAN) and informed London as to the nature of the problem. He also advised that following landing
gear extension the aircraft would have a very limited diversion capability and was really committed to a landing at Gatwick. He also advised that after landing he would need engineering assistance to vacate the runway. These messages were relayed to Gatwick where the emergency services were alerted. The commander also briefed the cabin supervisor and made a PA to the passengers informing them of the situation.
The aircraft was radar vectored towards the MAYFIELD HOLD where the slats, flaps and landing gear
where lowered (Final approach flap was restricted to 28° to cater for the possibility of a right engine
failure or precautionary shutdown during the approach). The commander re-briefed Gatwick ATC that
after landing the aircraft would need assistance to vacate the runway and informed them that as they
would be landing with the landing gear doors in the extended position sparks would be seen beneath
the aircraft during the landing run as the landing gear doors made contact with the runway surface.
The weather conditions at Gatwick for the approach were surface wind 260%15 kt gusting to 38 kt,
visibility 20 km with broken cloud at 2,500 and 3,500 feet. The commander decided, because of the
strong surface wind and turbulence, to use the right engine normally even though this caused the
vibration to return even more noticeably during the later stages of the approach. As the approach
continued the aircraft experienced considerable windshear with a marked loss of airspeed. The
commander reported that in his opinion recovery from this situation, which required almost go-around thrust, would have been difficult if not impossible had the aircraft made the approach on one engine.
The aircraft landed without further incident. The right landing gear door however, suffered minor
damage to its sacrificial rubbing strip, when it contacted several runway centreline lights.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f1dc40f0b61342000363/DC-9-83__MD-83___G-GMJM_07-94.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/6195417 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 17 June 1994 | G-GMJM | Airtours International Airways | 0 | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) |  |
min |
| Cabin safety event | ||||||
| 24 November 1996 | HB-IKN | Edelweiss Air | 0 | London Luton Airport (LTN/EGGW) | |
min |
| 25 February 2010 | EI-CRW | Meridiana | Cagliari |  |
non | |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 26-Jun-2025 17:49 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 26-Jun-2025 17:50 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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