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| Date: | Monday 19 September 1994 |
| Time: | c. 14:30 LT |
| Type: |  Airbus A340-311 |
| Owner/operator: | Virgin Atlantic Airways |
| Registration: | G-VAEL |
| MSN: | 015 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1993 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-5C2 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 296 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | near London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Tokyo-Narita International Airport (NRT/RJAA) |
| London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft departed Narita Airport in Japan at 0233 hrs on 18 September for the 12 hour 50 minute
overnight scheduled service to London Heathrow. The aircraft had been loaded with 84.1 tonnes of
fuel resulting in a take-off weight of 18 tonnes below the maximum structural weight. The fuel
quantity required for the flight had been determined by adding to the anticipated fuel burn of
75.5 tonnes a contingency allowance of 3.8 tonnes; 2.0 tonnes for diversion to the planned alternate
of Gatwick Airport; 2.3 tonnes reserve (equivalent to 30 minutes holding) and 500 kg for taxiing. No
'additional' fuel in excess of the minimum requirement was carried. The planned fuel remaining on
touchdown was 8.1 tonnes assuming that the contingency allowances were unused. The operating
company's minimum fuel requirement for diverting to Gatwick Airport was 4.3 tonnes.
On the ground at Narita Airport, the only recorded defect of operational significance was that one of
the two Fuel Control and Monitoring Computers (FCMC) indicated numerous faults during
preparations for the flight. The aircraft was despatched with just one operative FCMC in accordance
with the approved Master Minimum Equipment List. The departure was normal but the planned
cruising level was not available from Air Traffic Control until some 69 minutes after takeoff which
resulted in the aircraft using about 2 tonnes of the 3.8 tonnes contingency reserve. Thereafter, routine checks of fuel remaining were calculated in accordance with the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) instructions for a single FCMC fault by subtracting the fuel used indications from the fuel quantity loaded. During most of the flight, these checks indicated that the aircraft could land at
Heathrow with between 6.1 and 6.3 tonnes of fuel remaining.
Early during the cruise, the map symbology on the commander's Electronic Flight Instrument System
(EFIS) disappeared and although the flight plan was still displayed on his Multifunction Control and
Display Unit (MCDU), all calculations had ceased. The first officer who was handling the aircraft,
still had a fully functional EFIS and MCDU so the commander restored his own EFIS display by
switching to the 'BOTH ON 2' position thereby utilising the first officer's display management
computer (DMC) to drive both EFIS displays. About an hour later the commander returned his EFIS
display selector to the normal position to see if the navigation display had been restored, which it had. The aircraft then flew the remainder of the cruise with normal EFIS selections and normal navigation system performance.
Apart from the temporary loss of the commander's EFIS display, the cruise portion of the flight was
unremarkable and the pilots each obtained some rest in the flight crew bunk. In the latter portion of the cruise, logical indications from the No 2 FCMC were restored by resetting the computer. At this stage the tank quantities indicated that fuel was out of balance laterally by 1.5 tonnes left side heavy and so the pilots balanced the fuel by selective switching of the transfer pumps. The aircraft also encountered headwinds that were slightly stronger than forecast and the last recorded fuel check about one hour before landing indicated that the aircraft would land at Heathrow, assuming no delays, with 5.7 tonnes of fuel remaining.
The A340's navigation receivers are normally tuned automatically by computer but during descent the
first officer manually tuned the Lambourne VOR beacon using his MCDU so that he and the
commander could satisfy themselves that their EFIS navigation displays were accurate, which they
were. After a period of radar vectoring the aircraft was cleared to navigate direct to the VOR beacon
but a few miles east of Lambourne, the commander's EFIS map display symbology froze and lost all
computed data for no apparent reason. His MCDU displayed the message 'PLEASE WAIT' together
with a data entry page normally seen only when initialising the computer before flight; he was unable
to obtain any other display. At about the same time or very shortly afterwards, the first officer's EFIS
and MCDU exhibited identical behavior.
There was insufficient time for the crew to attempt to restore the EFIS displays so the commander
notified ATC of their navigation problem and the aircraft was given radar vectors to Lambourne and
instructed to descend to Flight Level (FL) 80 at 210 kt IAS. The controller then asked the crew to
confirm that the aircraft could still make an ILS approach because the runway visual range had reduced to 1,100 metres in heavy rain. The controller was assured that it could. At about this stage the commander began tuning the ILS, ADF and DME receivers for the approach to Runway 09 Right
using the Radio Management Panels. This is a "back-up method' and each aid for each pilot has to be
individually tuned using concentric frequency selector knobs in conjunction with a separate selector
key for each receiver. Whilst tuning the navaids for both pilots, the crew received an ECAM warning
of low fuel state and instructions to open the crossfeeds for Nos 3 and 4 engines. Shortly afterwards
the low fuel state warning recurred and the ECAM instructed the crew to open the crossfeeds for Nos 1 and 2 engines. At this stage the ECAM gave a fuel on board figure of 4.5 tonnes, some 2 tonnes less
than expected. Because the indicated fuel on board was less then the required diversion fuel, the
commander asked for the aircraft's position in the sequence of landing aircraft. When told his aircraft
was number seven in the sequence the commander replied "WE'RE GONNA HAVE TO CUT THAT SHORT,
WE'RE DECLARING A FUEL PROBLEM". The controller then asked the crew "JUST CONFIRM ITS A
FULL EMERGENCY" to which the commander replied "NEGATIVE, ITS NOT A FULL EMERGENCY AT
THE MOMENT BUT WE WILL HAVE TO CUT THAT SEQUENCE SHORT IF POSSIBLE". Before beginning
further discussion with the commander the controller then cleared the aircraft to descend to 4,000 feet on the QNH. After a short discussion, the commander agreed to declare a 'full emergency' whereupon ATC agreed to give the aircraft priority. When asked if the aircraft could accept a 16 mile final approach track, the commander stated that it could; at this stage the aircraft was above 7,000 feet altitude.
After a frequency change the aircraft was asked "ARE YOU HAPPY WITH 14 MILES?". The reply from
the handling pilot was "YES THAT'S FINE"; at this stage the aircraft was at about 7,000 feet altitude at
210 kt. The controller informed the crew that there were no speed restrictions and asked "IF I TURN
YOU ON TO BASE LEG THERE YOU GOT ABOUT ELEVEN MILES, IS THAT OK" to which the crew replied
"AFFIRMATIVE"; at this stage the aircraft was descending through 6,000 feet. On the final approach
intercept heading of 120° the aircraft was cleared to descend to 2,000 feet; it was then about nine miles from the runway at 5,300 feet at 175 KIAS and flaps at position 2. The crew informed ATC that they had established on the localizer and received clearance for further descent on the ILS before being sent to the Tower frequency.
The handling pilot was using the autopilot to acquire the ILS and he had armed the approach mode.
The aircraft intercepted a glideslope at 5 miles at an altitude of about 4,900 feet. The capture was very dynamic and the glide path bar moved rapidly down the ILS display before moving rapidly up once again; the autopilot's attempt to follow the glide path resulted in unusually high pitch rates and so the autopilot was disconnected. The commander informed the Tower "WE'VE GOT TO DO AN SRA....
WE'RE NOT PICKING UP THIS GLIDE-SLOPE". The aircraft executed a go-around and radar vectors were
then given for the surveillance radar approach terminating at two nautical miles. The crew were
informed that the cloud coverage was now 2 oktas at 400 feet, 5 oktas at 500 feet and 8 oktas at 900
feet.
Initially the SRA proceeded normally and the co-pilot re-engaged the autopilot in heading and height
modes. On the base leg heading of 180°, when a left turn onto 130° was demanded using the heading
selector knob, both heading bugs went left to 130° and the commander's flight director bar went to the left. However, the co-pilot's flight director bar went to the right and the aircraft turned right. At this stage the co-pilot disconnected the autopilot and flight directors and flew the aircraft manually in accordance with the headings and advisory altitudes. However, because of the unwanted turn, the
aircraft overshot the centreline and large heading corrections were required to regain it. When the
aircraft was established on the centerline and descent profile, both sets of ILS indications appeared to give correct information. After informing the crew that the RVR was now 1,300 meters, the controller cleared the aircraft to land and continued with the 'talk down' commentary. The crew saw the runway at about 500 feet altitude and the aircraft landed at 1503 hrs. After taxiing in and shutting down, the fuel indications recovered to 4.5 tonnes.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422fb2440f0b6134600089b/Airbus_A340-311__G-VAEL_03-95.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/6737069 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 30 April 1995 | G-VAEL | Virgin Atlantic Airways | 0 | Over Liège |  |
non |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 28-Jun-2025 14:16 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 28-Jun-2025 14:17 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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