You can contribute by submitting additional or updated information.
| Date: | Thursday 10 November 1994 |
| Time: | c. 19:06 LT |
| Type: |  Boeing 747-436 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-BNLA |
| MSN: | 23908/727 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 260 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | near Buenos Aires-Ministro Pistarini International Airport (EZE/SAEZ) -
 Argentina
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Buenos Aires-Ministro Pistarini International Airport (EZE/SAEZ) |
| London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft departed Buenos Aires, from Runway 1 at 1900 hrs (1600 hrs local time), for its
non-stop flight to London Heathrow. The weather at the time was fine with a temperature of 24°C,
calm winds and CAVOK conditions. The aircraft was being operated with a 'Heavy Crew'
complement which included an additional captain and first officer.
At approximately 1,300 feet and at a speed of 190 kt during the initial climb the crew heard a series of loud bangs sounding similar to severe engine surging. The commander noticed the EGT strip
instrument for No 4 engine rise and turn red as it exceeded the limits. As he retarded the thrust lever
for No 4 engine the EICAS (Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System) indicated 'FIRE ENGINE
No 4' and the fire warning bell sounded. The commander initiated the recall items from the engine fire checklist by closing the thrust lever, selecting the fuel lever to shut off and firing the first fire
extinguisher bottle. Thirty seconds later, with the fire indications still present, he fired the second
extinguisher bottle. Sensing the engine failure the automatic flight system indicated a level acceleration whereupon the flaps were retracted on the speed schedule. During the 'clean up' the first officer, who was the flying pilot, transmitted a 'MAYDAY' to the tower. Once 'clean' the aircraft took up a heading for the first waypoint and was climbed to 6,000 feet, a height above sector safe altitude and the minimum height for fuel jettison.
Shortly after the initial fire warning the second captain entered the flight deck and, with the agreement of the commander, started the fuel dumping procedure. At this stage the aircraft was 100,000 kg above its maximum normal landing weight. The second first officer, who was now also present on the flight deck, was sent by the commander to carry out a visual inspection of the No 4 engine from the rear of the cabin as a fire indication was still showing on the EICAS. The SCCM (Senior Cabin Crew Member) was also summoned to the flight deck and was told that the aircraft would be landing immediately. He returned to the cabin and broadcast the pre-recorded 'emergency landing' public address. Some moments later the second first officer returned to the flight deck and reported that no fire was visible on the No 4 engine. The commander now decided not to return to land immediately but to continue jettisoning fuel down to the maximum normal landing weight. This took approximately 1 hour and was carried out in VMC conditions at 6,000 feet over the River Platte estuary clear of built-up areas. During this time a cabin crew member was briefed to remain at door R5 to observe and report on the condition of No 4 engine.
With the fuel jettison complete the crew maneuvered the aircraft to commence a procedural three engine auto-land approach onto Runway 1 which was carried out without further incident. The emergency services and the resident company engineer attended the aircraft as it landed to examine the engine and brakes. With no further apparent problems the aircraft was escorted by the emergency services as it taxied to the stand. The passengers and crew deplaned normally.
The commander reported that although the emergency procedures could have been carried out
adequately by the two flight deck crew alone, the presence of the 'heavy crew' was a bonus and led to greater flexibility in resource management.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f881e5274a1314000697/Boeing_747-436__G-BNLA_07-95.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/6540320 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 17 March 1995 | G-BNLA | British Airways | 0 | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |  |
sub |
| Collision with other aircraft on apron | ||||||
| 22 January 1996 | G-BNLA | British Airways | 0 | over Abbeville |  |
min |
| Inflight fire | ||||||
| 25 February 1998 | G-BNLA | British Airways | 0 | Harare-Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport (HRE/FVRG) |  |
min |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 28-Jun-2025 15:44 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 28-Jun-2025 15:45 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2025 Flight Safety Foundation