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| Date: | Wednesday 22 February 1995 |
| Time: | c. 17:47 LT |
| Type: |  British Aerospace ATP |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-BTPD |
| MSN: | 2011 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1989 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 37 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Aberdeen International Airport (ABZ/EGPD) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) |
| Aberdeen International Airport (ABZ/EGPD) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The Glasgow based crew had spent Tuesday night at Manchester after a 8:51 hour duty period which
had finished at 2106 hrs. On Wednesday 2 February, they started their duty day at 1430 hrs with a
scheduled departure time of 1600 hrs for a flight to Aberdeen.
The aircraft subsequently departed Manchester at 1614 hrs and climbed, in cloud, to flight level (FL)
170; light icing and turbulence were experienced in the cruise. At 1701 hrs, the aircraft called
Aberdeen Radar while descending to FL90; it was cleared for further descent and, at 1710 hrs, joined
the Aberdeen visual circuit downwind right for Runway 16. The first officer was the handling pilot at
this stage with the commander intending to take control, or below, 1,000 feet on final approach.
When the commander moved the landing gear selector lever towards the DOWN position, it was very
stiff and would not go far enough down to allow it to engage in the detent; a "spongy" resistance to
further downward movement was felt. He applied more downward force without effect. The landing
gear indicators showed 3 red and 2 green lights; the nose gear green light was not illuminated. He
then took control of the aircraft while the first officer applied pressure to the lever with both hands, but again to no avail. The aircraft was now on base leg and so the commander passed control back to the first officer and again tried to force the lever down. The aircraft then established on final approach, with 15° flap selected, and as he was unable to resolve the problem the commander instructed the first officer to carry out a missed approach. When the landing gear selector was then moved to the UP position, the landing gear retracted normally and the position lights went out. The commander informed Aberdeen Tower of his intention at 1713 hrs, and was cleared to 3,000 feet and transferred to Aberdeen Radar.
At 1715 hrs, the commander informed ATC of their situation and requested permission to orbit to the
west of the airport while he attempted to resolve the problem. He then briefed the cabin crew.
When clear of the immediate area of the airport the autopilot was engaged, the airspeed was checked below 180 kt and the landing gear selector lever was again moved towards the DOWN position; however the landing gear indicators still showed 3 red and 2 green lights. The commander and first officer, in turn, attempted once more to force the lever down far enough to move it into the detent; however they were unsuccessful and so the landing gear was again retracted.
The crew then carried out the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) drill for ABNORMAL &
EMERGENCY LOWERING OF THE LANDING GEAR. The landing gear selector lever was moved
towards the DOWN position and it was confirmed that it could not be moved far enough to engage the
detent. The landing gear indicators showed 3 red and 2 green lights, as before. Circuit breaker Y14
was confirmed 'in' and the INDICATOR LEGENDS test button was pressed; the nose landing gear
green light did not illuminate. The commander withdrew the central light cluster but found it very
difficult to remove the defective bulbs and so he put the left cluster into the central position; both the red and green lights illuminated. He then managed to replace one of the defective bulbs and the cluster was refitted into the left position where it gave a normal indication; only one bulb was illuminated in the green section. The landing gear indicator now showed 3 red and 3 green lights and the crew continued with the drill. The hydraulic landing gear changeover lever was pulled and the DC pump was selected ON; the commander noted that the DC pump PRESS caption illuminated almost
immediately. A note in the drill confirmed that the landing gear was locked down with 3 red and 3
green lights illuminated, however, as the landing gear selector lever was not in the DOWN detent the
following applied:
'Hyd L/G changeover must be kept out DC pump will not now back-up brake accumulators
Do not check operation of brakes while airborne N/W steering is not now available'
When the drill had been completed, the first officer went into the cabin to check the main landing gear mechanical indicators. The commander briefed ATC that he had no nosewheel steering and would bring the aircraft to a halt on the runway and wait to be towed to the ramp. The controller
acknowledged this and, at 1729 hrs, told him that he would be number five in the pattern since he
wished to land other arriving aircraft before 'PD'.
At 1730 hrs, about 8 minutes after the changeover lever had been pulled, the HYD O/HEAT caption
illuminated on the central warning panel (CWP). Shortly after this, the first officer returned to the
flight deck, checked the nose gear mechanical indicator and confirmed to the commander that all three landing gear legs were indicating down and locked. The commander called the number one cabin attendant to the flight deck and briefed her that it would be a normal landing but as he did not have Nose Wheel steering available he would stop on the runway and await a tow to the ramp. As a
precaution, he asked her to move passengers from the immediate area of the propellers and seat them in the rear of the cabin; he then spoke to the passengers on the PA system.
The crew then consulted the HYDRAULIC OVERHEAT drill. As neither pump indicated an
abnormally high pressure, the drill required that both shut-off cocks, in turn, be selected SHUT for
5 minutes then OPEN, to establish which pump was causing the overheat. However the commander
decided that, as he was about to begin the approach and was satisfied that the landing gear was locked down, he would not action the drill. He then informed ATC that they were ready to make an approach and the crew then reviewed the ABNORMAL & EMERGENCY LOWERING OF THE LANDING
GEAR procedure to verify their actions.
At 1738 his, they actioned the approach checklist however when they came to the BRAKES &
HYDRAULICS check the commander noticed that all four brake operating gauge needles were
deflected to about ⅓ scale. At this point, the radar controller requested a left turn, heading 210°, and an report to confirm that the aircraft was established on the localiser. When he had acknowledged this call the commander consulted the HYDRAULIC PRESSURE TRAPPED IN BRAKES drill; he found that it required both pilots to operate the footbrakes repeatedly, until all brake pressures indicated zero. This directly contradicted the advice given in the ABNORMAL & EMERGENCY LOWERING OF THE LANDING GEAR drill and, he reasoned, would probably have left him with no braking. On
balance he decided that it would be preferable to land with the brakes partially applied with the
consequent risk of one or more tyres bursting. The commander informed ATC of this further problem
and shortly afterwards, at 1741 hrs, called localiser established and was transferred to Tower
frequency at 9 nm from touchdown.
The Airport Fire Service (AFS) had already gone to 'Local Standby' status and a discussion then took
place in the visual control room between the controller and the watch manager about whether or not to upgrade the emergency state. However the local services, both fire and ambulance, would not have had sufficient time to arrive before the aircraft landed and so the watch manager decided that, on balance, it was best to continue with the Local Standby response.
The commander briefed the number one cabin attendant of the new situation and told her to instruct the passengers to assume the brace position for landing. At 4 nm from touchdown, the aircraft was
cleared to land and the commander took control. The landing was to be achieved using 20° flap with a VREF of 106 kt; there was a crosswind component of about 15 kt from the right. At 200 feet above
ground level the first officer told the passengers to brace and was briefed to close both condition levers should the aircraft leave the runway. He called VrEf shortly before the aircraft touched down
smoothly on the mainwheels; it became immediately evident to the commander that the brakes were
already applied. During the ground run two tires burst and, as the aircraft slowed, it started to veer to the right; the commander instinctively applied full left tiller and left brake, and the first officer put both condition levers to OFF. The controller reacted immediately with a declaration of "Aircraft Accident" on the OMNI-CRASH system.
The aircraft came to a halt on the grass to the right of the runway and the passengers started to leave their seats. The number one cabin attendant urged them to remain seated. However, this was
immediately countermanded by the commander who decided to carry out an emergency evacuation.
The front left and rear right doors were opened and the slides were deployed. The overwing exits
were opened by nearby passengers; the left hatch was thrown out through the opening and there was
some initial confusion as an attempt was made to stow the right hatch inside. Other passengers then
started to mill around these exits. The cabin attendants reacted quickly and called them to the front and rear exits where they were then evacuated successfully; some passengers tried to take their baggage, but this was taken from them. The forward cabin attendant and one of the passengers sustained minor injuries during the evacuation.
The AFS, having been at 'Local Standby', were on the scene immediately. The local services, both
fire and ambulance, which had been alerted by the OMNI-CRASH system arrived some ten minutes
after the aircraft had come to a halt. The airfield was closed as a result of the incident until 2045 hrs.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f0e3ed915d137100031f/BAe_ATP__G-BTPD_06-95.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/10439776 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 9 November 2010 | LX-WAT | West Air Europe | 0 | Malta International (MLA/LMML) |  |
min |
| Tire failure | ||||||
| 22 May 2020 | SE-MAO | West Air Sweden | 0 | Birmingham International Airport (BHX/EGBB) | |
non |
| Runway excursion | ||||||
| 18 August 2020 | SE-MAO | West Air Sweden | 0 | near Guernsey, Channel Islands | |
non |
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 04-Jul-2025 20:02 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 04-Jul-2025 20:02 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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