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| Date: | Friday 19 July 2024 |
| Time: | 18:00 |
| Type: | H3 Dynamics Hexadrone Tundra 2 (Urban) |
| Owner/operator: | |
| Registration: | |
| MSN: | |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 0 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Singapore -
 Singapore
|
| Phase: | Manoeuvring (airshow, firefighting, ag.ops.) |
| Nature: | Test |
| Departure airport: | |
| Investigating agency: | TSIB Singapore |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
On 19 July 2024, an unmanned aircraft (UA) was undergoing a flight test from the roof top of a building in a built-up area. Soon after the UA took off for the eighth flight of the day, it could not be controlled and flew in an erratic manner instead of following the pre-programmed flight path.
The UA pilot and a remote control station operator were not able to regain control of the UA, which subsequently crashed into a residential building about 200m from the operational area. The UA dropped to the ground, landed about 1m from a person, and a fire ensued.
CONCLUSIONS
1 Due to lack of sufficient evidence and recorded data, the investigation team is not able to determine why the UA started to fly erratically shortly after take-off on the eighth flight and why the FCC’s Failsafe Function RTL Mode failed to perform to expectation.
2 While the regulator required an OP applicant to provide information to support the airworthiness of the UA if the UA is customised or significantly modified such that there is impact to its critical function, the regulation did not explain
what constitutes “customised or significant modifications” and what functions were considered critical. The OPH did not regard its modification of its UA was a modification which would affect the UA’s airworthiness.
3 OPT1 did not hold a UAPL when the regulator expected that a person in his role should hold a UAPL.
4 When making an application for the OP, the OPH submitted to the regulator the UA-OM which stated that the UA had a trigger that could be used to cut off power to the UA’s motors for the purpose of ending a flight. When the OPH discovered that the UA actually did not come with the trigger, it did not inform the regulator about the discrepancy in the UA-OM.
* Note: The Transport Safety Investigation Bureau of Singapore classified this occurrence as a serious incident.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
TSIB Singapore
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
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