| Date: | Tuesday 20 June 1995 |
| Time: | c. 16:45 LT |
| Type: | Lockheed L-1011-385-1-14 TriStar 100 |
| Owner/operator: | Caledonian Airways |
| Registration: | G-BBAH |
| MSN: | 193N-1101 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 415 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | 18 NM South of LUPEX Reporting Point, Casablanca FIR -
Morocco
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Tenerife-South Airport (TFS/GCTS) |
| Destination airport: | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:After an uneventful flight from Manchester to Tenerife South, the aircraft was turned round and took
off at 1548 hrs, with the commander as handling pilot, to return to Manchester. There had been no
technical problems with the aircraft on the outward journey.
At 1645 hrs the aircraft was in the cruise at Flight Level (FL) 310 and Mach O.84, some 18 nm South
of Lupex, a mandatory reporting point in the Casablanca Flight Information Region (FIR); the cabin
differential was normal at 8.2 psi. Suddenly, the flight crew heard a loud 'muffled bang' followed by
a feeling of pressure on their ears and the cabin altimeter indicated that the cabin pressure was
'climbing' at a rate greater than 2,000 ft/min. The flight crew donned oxygen masks and immediately
commenced an emergency descent in accordance with their standard procedures. The commander was now manually flying the aircraft and the first officer was operating the radios. They had been working Casablanca Radio and had broadcast their emergency on that frequency. Within the cabin, the purser and all but one of his crew had heard the bang and felt pressure on their ears; one cabin attendant was below in the galley and only felt the change in ear pressure. The purser noted that the passenger oxygen masks had not deployed and went immediately to the flight deck to inform the flight engineer who then deployed the oxygen masks manually. The automatic system had not activated because cabin pressure had not yet reached the appropriate altitude. All the oxygen doors opened, but some of the masks did not drop; these were pulled down by the cabin attendants, or adjacent passengers. One steward in the rear service area pulled one mask to activate it, but it came off in his hand. All the passengers complied with the crew's instructions and the pre-recorded emergency descent announcement was broadcast twice; this was automatically activated when the passenger oxygen masks deployed.
The commander levelled the aircraft at FL100 after completing the descent at a speed slightly less than the maximum operating speed. During the descent, the commander was informed by the purser that there were no problems within the cabin, apart from some degree of understandable shock. There had been a smell of burning within the cabin following the activation of the emergency oxygen masks, but the purser was aware that this was not unusual because of the degree of heat produced by the associated oxygen generators. However, this smell of burning did cause the passengers some
understandable anxiety. After levelling, the flight crew made a full check of the aircraft systems.
Apart from the pressurisation failure the only other apparent problem was that a landing gear 'Truck'
light had illuminated; the crew considered that this may have happened because of the requirement to select the gear down during the emergency descent. The commander also considered that the aircraft had handled normally during both the descent and the level-off. By this stage the first officer had established communications with Lisbon ATC, who acknowledged their emergency and confirmed the aircraft position. The commander then reviewed the situation: G-BBAH was approximately half-way between Tenerife and Faro; the crew and passengers were well; there were no handling problems with the aircraft. The commander then made the decision to divert to Faro and informed the passengers of the situation and his intentions.
During the transit to Faro, 4,000 kg of fuel was dumped to reduce the aircraft landing weight to
160,000 kg. The 'Truck' warning required the use of the emergency landing procedure. After
briefing the purser on this aspect, the commander informed the passengers of the need for an
emergency landing. Within the cabin, the purser briefed his crew and the passengers on the
forthcoming landing. The cabin crew then went to each passenger to confirm that they were all aware of the procedure. Thereafter, G-BBAH received full and effective priority from Faro ATC for their approach and landing on Runway 29. As speed was reduced on finals, the crew noted that the 'Truck' light went out. After landing at 1750 hrs, the aircraft was followed by the Airport fire vehicles to its designated stand where the other emergency services were positioned. The passengers and crew disembarked normally.
Accident investigation:
|
|
| | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Report number: | |
| Status: | Investigation completed |
| Duration: | 8 months |
| Download report: | Final report
|
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f7c3e5274a13170006c9/Lockheed_L1011-385-1-14_Tristar__G-BBAH_02-96.pdf https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/9551120 (Photo)
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
| 03-Aug-2025 14:36 |
Justanormalperson |
Added |
| 03-Aug-2025 14:36 |
Justanormalperson |
Updated [Category, ] |
| 03-Aug-2025 14:39 |
Justanormalperson |
Updated [Category, Accident report, ] |
| 03-Aug-2025 14:41 |
Justanormalperson |
Updated [Category, ] |
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