You can contribute by submitting additional or updated information.
| Date: | Sunday 17 December 1995 |
| Time: | c. 13:52 LT |
| Type: |  Fokker F-27 Friendship 500 |
| Owner/operator: | Jersey European Airways |
| Registration: | G-JEAG |
| MSN: | 10639 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1982 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 41 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | near Leeds-Bradford Airport (LBA/EGNM) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Leeds-Bradford Airport (LBA/EGNM) |
| Jersey Airport, Channel Islands (JER/EGJJ) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
As the aircraft was passing through FL 035 on departure from Leeds-Bradford Airport, the flight
crew became aware of a strong burning smell on the flight deck; shortly after this they received
anaural/visual warning of a No 1 engine fire. The commander called for engine fire drill No 1
engine, disconnected the autopilot and prepared for a return to the departure aerodrome. When
feathering had been confirmed as completed, the engine fire extinguisher 'shot one' was fired and the
engine fire warning ceased. The commander reported that some time had been wasted trying to
break the safety wire on the engine fire extinguisher switch guard. ATC were informed and
provided vectoring for a return to visual right base Runway 14.
The No 1 cabin attendant came to the flight deck for briefing during the shutdown, but the
commander was unable to brief at that time so she left and returned to the flight deck after the shut
down was complete. Given the minimal time available prior to landing the commander authorised a
full emergency landing brief, and when good visual contact with the airfield had been established, he
made a short public address announcement to the passengers. On final approach the commander
informed the No 1 cabin attendant that passengers were not required to brace for landing and not to
evacuate unless instructed to do so, however by this time the passengers were already briefed and
were therefore left in the brace position.
A single engine landing was carried out, and, when the aircraft had been brought to a stop, the
commander saw smoke coming from the No 1 engine intake and immediately ordered an evacuation
to starboard and feathered the No 2 propeller. Shortly after the evacuation had commenced he
noticed that passengers were exiting from the port side, and accordingly questioned a fireman
(outside his side window) who stated that as smoke was also coming from the starboard brakes, the
cabin staff were advised to evacuate the passengers from the aft port side. Communication
difficulties were experienced throughout the emergency due to the intermittent failure of the
captain's transmit facility, poor R/T and flight deck intercom bias which could not be adjusted to an
acceptable level, and poor flight deck - cabin crew interphone.
Subsequent examination of the No 1 engine revealed that the No 2 combustion chamber had failed,
causing damage to the intermediate magnesium casing and the No 3 combustion chamber, see
photograph. The No 2 combustion chamber was sent to the AAIB for a visual examination at DRA
Pyestock, from whence it was taken back to the aircraft operator's engineering facility where it, and
the other combustion chambers, were examined by AAIB, the operator, the engine manufacturer
and the repair agency. From there it was sent to the engine manufacturer for a detailed metallurgical
examination.
The No 2 combustion chamber had failed after use following a second repair, whereas the
remaining combustion chambers in the set were only on their first repair. The No 2 combustion
chamber therefore had a flametube barrel that had accumulated approximately 3,000 hours more
than the other six combustion chambers. Most gas turbines will show a range of combustion
chamber lives and it is not uncommon for there to be a factor of four between the shortest and
longest life flametube, and although the level of damage in the No 2 combustion chamber was
unusually high, at least one of the 'younger' flametubes had already started to show considerable
distress.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ea7540f0b61342000003/dft_avsafety_pdf_501712.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/393237 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 26 May 1999 | G-JEAG | Jersey European Airways | 0 | 6 NM South of Ringa | |
non |
| Fumes/smoke/odor event | ||||||
| 18 January 2007 | TC-MBE | MNG Airlines | 0 | Coventry-Baginton Airport (CVT) | |
w/o |
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 09-Aug-2025 20:53 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 09-Aug-2025 20:54 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
The Aviation Safety Network is an exclusive service provided by:
Quick Links:
| ASN Home | Send Correction / Feedback |
| FSF Home | Disclaimer | Copyright |
| Contact Us | Privacy Policy |
| Press / Media |
CONNECT WITH US:
©2025 Flight Safety Foundation