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| Date: | Friday 5 April 1996 |
| Time: | c. 06:50 LT |
| Type: |  Boeing 757-236 |
| Owner/operator: | British Airways |
| Registration: | G-BIKF |
| MSN: | 22177/16 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1983 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 96 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Pushback / towing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | London-Heathrow Airport (LHR/EGLL) |
| Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft was about to push back from stand C49 on a scheduled service from London to Zurich
with 7 crew and 89 passengers onboard (6 club class, 83 economy). Passenger boarding had
been routine, all doors were closed but not yet armed, and the e had been removed. The
ground power supply to the aircraft had been disconnected as the auxiliary power unit (APU) was
providing aircraft electrical power and air for cabin conditioning. The tug and towbar were attached
and a ground engineer was in contact with the flight crew via the external intercom.
The commander requested, and was granted, push-back clearance from ATC but was told to wait for
other ground traffic to clear from behind his aircraft before moving. He therefore selected the anti-
collision beacon 'ON', but kept the parking brake applied. The crew, in preparation for engine
start, had actioned the 'Before Start' checklist and had selected the air conditioning 'PACKS' to 'OFF'.
At this stage, the cabin service director (CSD) was making his final check of the cabin and was
walking to the rear of the aircraft. As he approached seat rows 19 to 20, he heard a "thud" and saw
what appeared to be a shower of "confetti" rise into the air adjacent to seat row 24 (the last row
before the centre toilets). He also noticed the cabin atmosphere become contaminated with a blue-
grey mist. He turned and immediately made his way to the flight deck to inform the commander that
"there had been an explosion and that the cabin was filling with smoke". The commander, who had
also heard a faint thud and felt a slight pressure surge on his ears, looked past the CSD into the
cabin and was able to see a 'bluish smoke haze' to the rear.
The commander immediately instructed the first officer to call for the airport emergency services on
the ground movement frequency whilst he called the company on the ground handling frequency to
request full ground support and for the jetty to be repositioned at door L1. He then made a public
address (PA) to the passengers instructing them to move forward. On hearing the first
officer transmit that there had been an explosion on board the aircraft, the ATC watch supervisor,
using the omnicrash communications system, instigated full emergency procedures by declaring an
"AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT". This alerted not only the airfield emergency services but also those from
neighbouring local authorities. The fire crews were on scene within two minutes, at 0657 hrs.
Two ground dispatchers rapidly appeared in the mouth of the jetty and were hurried in their
positioning of the jetty by the commander shouting through the open flight deck direct vision (DV)
window. The CSD, who was standing in the flight deck doorway and listening to updates from the
rear cabin crew over the interphone, then informed the commander that the smoke intensity was
increasing. On hearing this, and seeing that the jetty was moving rapidly towards the forward door,
the commander ordered the CSD to open the front door (door L1) and evacuate the passengers as
soon as the jetty was in position. The commander then made a further PA instructing the passengers
to "leave the aircraft quickly, without hand baggage, by the front door". The evacuation into the
terminal lounge was fast and orderly and conducted without incident.
The flight crew did not action the evacuation checklist, but during the evacuation the first officer
selected the aircraft systems (ie fuel, hydraulics etc) to 'off'. He suggested to the commander that the
APU should also be shut-down, but the commander decided against this action and put the PACKS to
'ON' in an attempt to remove or dissipate the smoke.
At this stage, with no previous warning indications on the flight deck, the commander noticed that
one 'CARGO FIRE-BOTTLE DISCHARGE LIGHT' was 'ON' and as he watched, the second 'DISCHARGE
LIGHT' illuminated. This also brought to his attention the cargo fire bottle discharge messages on the
engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS) display. Although there was no associated
indication of a 'CARGO FIRE', the commander ordered the first officer to carry out the 'CARGO FIRE'
checklist. The first item on the checklist is to select the 'CARGO COMPARTMENT ARMING SWITCH'
(for the affected cargo compartment) to 'ARM'. This action, in the case of the AFT CARGO
COMPARTMENT, arms the No 1 and No 2 cargo fire extinguishers, turns off the cargo heat fan and
cargo heater, turns off the recirculation fan and switches the right air conditioning pack to high flow. However, as both fire-bottle discharge lights had already illuminated the crew believed that
activation of the arming switch was irrelevant and therefore did not action this checklist item.
As the fire service arrived the commander attempted, without success, to contact the fire crew on
ground frequency of 121.6 MHz. However, as the flight crew vacated the aircraft to join the
passengers and cabin crew in the lounge, the fire crew arrived in the cabin. The commander
reported that as he left the aircraft smoke had reached the forward cabin and, whilst "thicker"
than first observed, was not too dense and visibility was approximately one third to one half of the
cabin length.
The APU was still running as the fire crew boarded the aircraft and, although the commander could
not remember selecting the APU to OFF before he vacated the aircraft, fire crew personnel
reported that the commander did in fact select the APU off at their request.
Once on board, the fire crew used a thermal imaging camera which indicated a 'hot spot' in the rear
cargo hold. The rear cargo hold was subsequently emptied of luggage, but nothing unusual was
found. The panelling at the forward end of the rear cargo bay was removed and, although no fire
damage was found, it was observed that the insulation material in the exposed bay had
been disturbed. Further examination of this zone was performed after the arrival of AAIB and it was
found that the hot air delivery duct from the APU to the pneumatic manifold had fractured
(see illustration for location).
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f82ced915d13740006a5/dft_avsafety_pdf_502111.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/7553532 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 11 September 1996 | G-BIKF | British Airways | 0 | Over Forest Dale Estate, Croydon, Surrey | |
min |
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 10-Aug-2025 11:28 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 10-Aug-2025 11:29 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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