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| Date: | Monday 13 October 1997 |
| Time: | c. 07:05 LT |
| Type: |  Fokker 100 |
| Owner/operator: | Air UK |
| Registration: | G-UKFK |
| MSN: | 11249 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1988 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 105 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Location: | near Amsterdam -
 Netherlands
|
| Phase: | Initial climb |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS/EHAM) |
| London-Stansted Airport (STN/EGSS) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The Captain reported that the aircraft reached FL60 on departure from Schiphol, with the autopilot
off. Whilst in IMC, it encountered precipitation in the form of small hail stones; the weather radar
was in use and showed no hard core closer than 5 nm. The aircraft then received a lightning strike.
The cabin crew observed what they described as fire-balls in the cabin, originating at the front and
appearing to exit in the region of the overwing emergency doors. The Captain observed the master
caution lights operating and warnings of EL 1 and EL 2 appearing on the MFDU, indicating that
hydraulic pressure had fallen in both right and left systems of the elevator hydraulic control unit.
The crew check list calls for the appropriate illuminated push button on the overhead hydraulic
panel to be operated (a 'fault' caption normally illuminates in the appropriate push button when
hydraulic pressure falls in the relevant actuator causing the Flight Warning System to be signalled).
Operation of the button places the appropriate hydraulic elevator boost system in bypass mode.
Should fault warnings appear on both elevator buttons, the check list calls for both to be operated,
hence placing both systems in bypass. This action removes all hydraulic boost from the elevator
control, causing it to revert to manual operation. Under such conditions the elevator gearing alters.
The checklist actions were carried out and the crew elected to return to Schiphol (in manual
elevator mode) where an uneventful landing was carried out. It is understood that flying with
manual elevator is a procedure periodically practised in the simulator. The commander commented
that the aircraft 'felt a bit peculiar' operating in this mode.
Subsequent examination of the aircraft indicated that the lightning had routed through the aircraft
between the nose area and the elevators. Damage included functional failure of both elevator boost
system Sequence Valve Proximity Switches, (sometimes known as the bypass switches). These are
sited on the left and right manifold assemblies of the elevator hydraulic boost controller, itself
positioned in the area of the junction between the fin and tailplane. The switches are normally each
operated by movement of the associated sequence valve in the left or right hand manifold assembly
respectively when loss of hydraulic pressure within the relevant manifold allows spring forces to
move the valves fully to the shut-off position. The manufacturers state that under such conditions,
the switches provide signal to the Flight Warning Computer, the Flight Control Computer (for
autopilot functions) and the Maintenance and test panel (for maintenance purposes only). The aircraft also sustained other damage to the fuselage, stabilizers, and Pitot Tubes.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/542300eeed915d1371000af1/dft_avsafety_pdf_502452.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/74097 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 24 September 1998 | G-UKFK | KLM UK | 0 | Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport (AMS/EHAM) | |
min |
| Wheel loss/failure | ||||||
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 17-Aug-2025 19:44 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 17-Aug-2025 19:45 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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