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| Date: | Monday 3 January 1994 |
| Time: | c. 03:55 UTC |
| Type: |  Boeing 747-419 |
| Owner/operator: | Air New Zealand |
| Registration: | ZK-NBA |
| MSN: | 25605/933 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1992 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 461 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Incident |
| Location: | near Narsarsuaq -
 Greenland
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Los Angeles International Airport, CA (LAX/KLAX) |
| London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) | |
| Investigating agency: | TAIC |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Prior to the flight at about 2045 hours on 2 January 1994, the First Officer felt a tearing sensation and
severe pain in his back when he bent over to pick up a suitcase. The pain eased gradually but returned with certain movements and radiated down into his right leg.
Boeing 747-400, ZK-NBU departed from Los Angeles at 2255 hours, as Flight NZ 2, to Gatwick. The
flight deck crew consisted of the Captain, the First Officer and a Second Officer. In addition there were 14 cabin crew and 444 passengers on board.
The First Officer felt no further pain and had no problem meeting the physical requirements of the take-off as pilot not flying.
Some five hours after the aircraft departed from Los Angeles the First Officer's pain returned and he
experienced numbness and loss of function in his right leg.
A doctor on board the aircraft pronounced the First Officer as unfit for further flying duties and
administered the appropriate medication for a suspected prolapsed disc. The injury was later found to be limited to a back strain and the First Officer returned to full flying duties after a short convalescence in New Zealand.
The Second Officer took over the First Officer's duties for the remaining nine hours of the flight.
As the operator's policy at the time was not to permit Second Officers to occupy a pilot seat below
20000 feet the Captain applied for and received clearance from the operator for the Second Officer to continue his assistance during the approach and landing at Gatwick.
The operator's training program included regular consideration of the action to be taken by the
remaining technical crew members if one of their number became subtly incapacitated. The appropriate response to such situations was practiced during simulator training.
The action to be taken in cases of more obvious incapacitation was listed in Standard Operating
Procedures and the flight deck Quick Reference Handbook as follows:
"Standard Operating Procedures FLIGHT CREW INCAPACITATION
Incapacitation of a crew member may not be immediately apparent and proper monitoring will ensure that partial or total incapacitation is not ignored. When doubt exists, question the individual concerned, twice if necessary, and if no reasonable response is received incapacitation is to be assumed and positive control indicated by stating "I have control". The first action is to maintain a safe flight path making maximum use of the autopilot. Remaining crew should occupy the crew seats appropriate to their qualifications until the end of the landing roll. Obtain the maximum assistance from the ground and declare an emergency. Supernumerary or passengering crew may be used to carry out any duties consistent with their training and qualifications."
Quick Reference Handbook (QRH)
"PILOT INCAPACITATION Take over if appropriate stating "I have control". Ensure safe flight path. Use autopilot. Summon assistance. Declare an emergency. Ascertain whether there are medically qualified passengers and type qualified technical crew available. Reorganize duties. Follow Standard Procedures."
On this occasion the pilot in command did not declare an emergency even though the standard operating procedure gave no latitude in this decision.
The QRH's last item "Follow Standard Procedures" was of little assistance as the standard procedure
added nothing to the guidance given in the check list.
It would not have been practical for detailed instructions to be formulated for the various potential flight management decisions required in the large variety of situations which could have arisen. For example, a further crew incapacitation before the completion of the flight, the necessity to divert for emergency medical assistance or the need to decide whether to turn back or not.
While it appeared that the decision as to whether an emergency should be declared was not left to
the discretion of the remaining crew member(s), it was apparent that the crew resource management programs already in place provided adequate training for the crew to make the appropriate decision.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.taic.org.nz/sites/default/files/inquiry/documents/94-003.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/6183954 (Photo)
History of this aircraft
Other occurrences involving this aircraft
| 12 March 1997 | ZK-NBU | Air New Zealand | 0 | 300 nm NE of Auckland |  |
non |
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 24-Aug-2025 12:49 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 24-Aug-2025 12:49 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
| 24-Aug-2025 12:53 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Location, Country, Category, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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