Incident ATR 72-202 G-BWTL, Sunday 21 December 1997
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Date:Sunday 21 December 1997
Time:c. 19:06 LT
Type:Silhouette image of generic AT72 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
ATR 72-202
Owner/operator:British Airways Express, opb CityFlyer Express
Registration: G-BWTL
MSN: 441
Year of manufacture:1994
Engine model:P&W Canada PW124B
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 54
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Location:near Goodwood -   United Kingdom
Phase: Approach
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK)
Destination airport:Jersey Airport, Channel Islands (JER/EGJJ)
Investigating agency: AAIB
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
The crew reported for duty at 1005 hours. Their first scheduled sector was an 1120 hrs departure
for Cork, returning to Gatwick at 1515 hrs. This was to be followed by a 1545 hrs departure for
Jersey, returning to Gatwick at 1815 hrs. For operational reasons the first sector was changed to an
1140 hrs departure for Amsterdam, returning to Gatwick at 1450 hrs. The late arrival of some of the
passengers delayed departure until 1320 hrs; the aircraft arrived back at Gatwick at 1640 hrs.
The aircraft eventually took off at 1740 hrs for Jersey; the first officer was the handling pilot. The
flight progressed normally and the aircraft was transferred to Jersey Zone control at 1801 hrs. At
that time the RVR on Runway 09 was greater than 1,500 metres. The aircraft was transferred to
Jersey Approach control at 1808 hrs and was given radar vectors for the ILS approach to
Runway 09.

By 1811 hrs the RVR had reduced to 750 metres at touchdown, 600 metres at midpoint and 650
metres at the stop end; the required minima was 800 metres. The commander decided to hold at the
'JW'. Before the aircraft reached the beacon, there was a temporary improvement to 800 metres but
no sooner had the commander decided to make an approach than it deteriorated to 550 metres. The
aircraft continued towards the 'JW' and descended to 3,000 feet.

At 1818 hrs the RVR increased to 900 metres and once again the commander decided to attempt an
approach. The crew reported that they could see most of the island except for the area around the
airport. At 1820 hrs, the RVR reduced to 350 metres. The approach was discontinued from the
downwind position and the aircraft entered the hold at SHARK at 2,000 feet.

The RVR remained constant at 400 metres for some time and, at 1831 hrs, the commander told
ATC that he could hold for a further 15 minutes before having to return to Gatwick. He then
requested the RVR on Runway 27; this was 1,500 metres at touchdown, 450 metres at midpoint and
400 metres at the stop end. He decided to make an approach to Runway 27, however, the RVR
reduced to 600 metres, the minima for Runway 27. It deteriorated further to 350 metres but then
improved to 1,500 metres. The commander decided to continue the approach but by the time the
aircraft had reached the base leg, the RVR had reduced to 400 metres. The approach was
discontinued and the aircraft headed towards the 'JSY' VOR to take up the hold. The commander
made the decision to divert to Gatwick at 1847 hrs; he reported that the fuel remaining at that time
was 1,160 lb.

The commander called London Area Control at 1900 hrs and was told there were delays of 30 to
35 minutes at Gatwick; he was given a direct routing to Goodwood and told to expect a WILLO 3C
arrival. The commander acknowledged this and requested "---- A PRIORITY LANDING AS WE'VE
BEEN HOLDING DOWN AT JERSEY----". The controller asked how much holding fuel he had and was
told about 15 minutes.

At 1903 hrs, the controller advised the commander that he would be asked on the next frequency if
he was declaring an emergency. He explained that it was the only way ATC would be able to give
him a priority approach. The commander then told ATC that he would be able to hold for about 5
minutes. He confirmed that he would be declaring an emergency and the controller suggested that
he "MIGHT AS WELL DECLARE YOUR EMERGENCY NOW". The commander confirmed this at 1905
hrs and was subsequently told that he would be given radar vectors for a WILLO 3C arrival
followed by a straight in approach.

The first officer expressed his reservations about the commander's decision to declare an
emergency in order to continue the diversion to Gatwick; he considered that Southampton was the
preferred option as the weather was better and it was not fuel critical. He continued to express his
reservations even after the commander had made his decision.

At 1920 hrs, the commander called Gatwick Director and reported that they were descending to
FL70 on course to Goodwood.

Over the next two minutes the following transmissions were exchanged between the commander and ATC:

Aircraft "----HOW ARE YOUR QUEUES NOW WE BY DECLARING AN EMERGENCY WE WERE TOLD WE WOULDN'T BE DELAYED WE COULD HOLD FOR TEN MINUTES OR SO AND CANCEL THE EMERGENCY IF THE DELAYS WERE ONLY TEN MINUTES OR SO".

Controller "--- THEY'RE STILL IN EXCESS OF TWENTY MINUTES".

Aircraft "---OH STILL IN EXCESS OF TWENTY MINUTES".

Controller “---YOU WISH TO CONFIRM THAT YOUR EMERGENCY STILL EXISTS".

Aircraft "----IT LOOKS AS IF WE REALLY OUGHT TO GO TO SOUTHAMPTON AND NOT DECLARE THE EMERGENCY ORIGINALLY WE WERE TOLD HALF AN HOUR WHICH WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US AND WE DON'T REALLY WANT TO DECLARE AN EMERGENCY ALTHOUGH IT'S A BIT LATE FOR THAT NOW".

Shortly after this the commander spoke to the Company Operations. The first officer monitored this
conversation which initially went normally but then he became aware that the commander was not
responding. He reported that when he looked across at the commander, he was slumped in his seat,
his head was down and his eyes appeared to be "unfocused". There were beads of sweat starting to
appear on his forehead. The first officer talked to him and shook his arm, however, he got no
response.

Just before 1926 hrs the first officer made the following transmission:

"---WE DO DEFINITELY WANT TO CONTINUE TO GATWICK NOW MY SKIPPER IS NOT THAT WELL CURRENTLY I'LL KEEP YOU INFORMED I THINK HE'S STILL WITH ME"

At about 1927 hrs, the commander appeared to suddenly recover from his incapacitation. Initially,
he was very animated and after a short period of confusion he continued in the role of non-handling
pilot. The crew executed a standard Category 2 approach; the commander took control at decision
height and carried out a normal landing. The aircraft was on the ground at 1938 hrs.

A Local Standby had been initiated by ATC. The AFS attended the aircraft and followed it to the
stand. The commander had apparently fully recovered and declined to be examined by the
paramedics who attended; both crew members were interviewed by Airport Police before they left
the stand area.

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: AAIB
Report number: 
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 6 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422f438e5274a13170004f7/dft_avsafety_pdf_501188.pdf

https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/10374467 (Photo)

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
11-Sep-2025 20:44 Justanormalperson Added
11-Sep-2025 20:45 Justanormalperson Updated [Accident report, ]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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