Serious incident de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103 LN-WIP, Thursday 22 December 2022
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Date:Thursday 22 December 2022
Time:19:02 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8A model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different    
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-103
Owner/operator:Widerøes Flyveselskap
Registration: LN-WIP
MSN: 239
Year of manufacture:1990
Engine model:P&W Canada PW120
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 32
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:near Svolvær-Helle Airport (SVJ/ENSH) -   Norway
Phase: Approach
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Bodø Airport (BOO/ENBO)
Destination airport:Svolvær-Helle Airport (SVJ/ENSH)
Investigating agency: NSIA
Confidence Rating: Accident investigation report completed and information captured
Narrative:
Wideroe flight WF834, a DHC-8-103,received a pull-up warning from the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) during approach to runway 01 at Svolvær airport (ENSH). Uncorrected QNH setting resulted in the plane flying 700 feet lower than the indicated barometric altitude. The aircraft returned to Bodø (ENBO) where a normal landing was performed.

The investigation has shown weaknesses in the procedures used by Widerøe for setting and verifying QNH. The investigation has also shown that there is no system for monitoring QNH in Norwegian airspace.

The flight from Bodø to Svolvær was planned with marginal weather conditions in Svolvær. En route, the crew were informed that snow had to be cleared from the runway at Svolvær Airport Helle and that they were cleared to a holding pattern. They started their approach after spending approx. 10 minutes in the holding pattern around the reporting point OSRUL. The crew had forgotten to set the local QNH for the approach and was therefore 700 ft (213 m) below the indicated altitude. When the aircraft was 3.1 NM from the runway threshold, EGPWS calculated the aircraft’s geometric altitude to be below the Runway Field Clearance Floor (RFCF) vertical profile and gave an aural ‘Too Low terrain’ alert. The crew immediately aborted their approach and returned the Bodø, where they landed.

The checklists and procedures used by Widerøe to set correct QNH before landing were thought of as individual barriers. The investigation has shown that the checklists and procedures had some dependencies making them less efficient barriers.

The investigation has shown that there is no single technical system in use in Norwegian airspace that is capable of detecting deviations between reported QNH and the airplane’s QNH, and that human barriers alone are not enough to guarantee that local QNH is set. There are ways of displaying an aircraft QNH as part of Surveillance (SUR), provided that Avinor Air Navigation Services (ANS) Norwegian Air Traffic Control System (NATCON) is used as the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. The air traffic services performed the duties of Aerodrome Flight Information Service (AFIS) at Svolvær airport Helle. There are currently no procedures in place for this service to be provided by AFIS.

Based on this investigation the NSIA is of the opinion that an independent system for monitoring aircraft pressure setting, with operational procedures, will increase aviation safety. Avinor ANS has equipped several air traffic control units and flight information units with a monitoring system called SUR. SUR is considered a supporting tool for AFIS and does not change the service provided even where new systems have been introduced.

The NSIA issues a safety recommendation to the Norwegian CAA to assess the risk posed by incorrectly set QNH and to implement risk-reducing measures. A safety recommendation is issued to Widerøe recommending that the company upgrade the transponders on their aircraft to enable them to transmit pressure settings and thus be part of a system for monitoring aircraft pressure settings (QNH) in Norwegian airspace. A safety recommendation is also issued to Widerøe to review its checklists and procedures for verification of QNH.

METAR:

ENSH 221720Z 20009KT 170V240 9999 -SHSN FEW008 BKN018 00/M02 Q0988 RMK WIND 150FT 26010G26KT 200V340
ENSH 221920Z 36004KT 310V060 1300 SHSN VV006 M00/M01 Q0987 RMK WIND 150FT 30004KT 230V360

Accident investigation:
cover
  
Investigating agency: NSIA
Report number: 2025/10
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 2 years and 9 months
Download report: Final report

Sources:

NSIA

Location

Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
28-Sep-2025 14:10 ASN Added
28-Sep-2025 14:11 ASN Updated [Location, ]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description

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