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| Date: | Friday 22 January 1999 |
| Time: | c. 18:05 LT |
| Type: |  British Aerospace BAe-125-800A |
| Owner/operator: | EMC Corporation |
| Registration: | N453TM |
| MSN: | 258203 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 5 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Minor |
| Location: | Farnborough Airport (FAB/EGLF) -
 United Kingdom
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Executive |
| Departure airport: | Blackpool International Airport (BLK/EGNH) |
| Farnborough Airport (FAB/EGLF) | |
| Investigating agency: | AAIB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The aircraft had been based at Cork Airport (Ireland) for about 10 months for non-scheduled
corporate passenger operations. The aircraft was crewed by one full time pilot (the commander at
the time of this accident) and part-time contract co-pilots. The commander had operated into
Farnborough Airport on a number of previous occasions.
On 21 January, the aircraft operated Cork-Farnborough-Blackpool-Cork with the same commander,
who finished duty at 2145 hrs after a 9.75 hour duty period. On 22 January the commander, and the
duty co-pilot for the day, reported for duty at 1500 hrs. The aircraft departed from Cork at 1626 hrs
for a flight to Blackpool; the destination for five of the passengers. The aircraft then departed from
Blackpool at 1720 hrs for Farnborough, where the three remaining passengers would leave the
aircraft before it was positioned empty to Cork. The commander was the handling pilot for the
sector.
The crew was aware from the Farnborough Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) that fog was
forecast to be present at the time of the planned arrival and the flight plan indicated that
Southampton and Biggin Hill Airports were the nominated landing alternates (where the visibilities
were 6 km and 2,000 metres respectively). The fog had been present for much of the afternoon at
Farnborough, with a Runway Visual Range (RVR) of 200 metres being recorded from 1513 hrs
until the time of the accident. The surface wind was calm, visibility 100 metres in fog, overcast
cloud below 100 feet, temperature +1°C, mean sea level pressure 1026 mb. The nominated duty
runway was Runway 25, which has a threshold elevation of 219 feet amsl.
The aircraft was being operated under US Federal Aviation Regulations Part 91, Instrument Flight
Rules which, for private aircraft operations, does not preclude the commencement of an instrument
approach when the visibility is below the prescribed minimum RVR for the type of approach being
conducted. The crew had reference to the Jeppesen approach plate for the Precision Approach
Radar (PAR) approach procedure for Runway 25 at Farnborough. For an approach speed Category
C aircraft such as the BAe 125, this procedure gave approach minima of: Decision Altitude
(Height) of 510 (291) feet, and RVR 650 metres (these figures had been produced to comply with
JAR-OPS criteria).
The commander had undertaken a European operations briefing course in the USA but could not
recall the precise detail of the UK 'Approach Ban' legislation. Detail of this legislation was
contained in the Air Traffic Control section of the Jeppesen Airway Manual, but this was not
referred to by the crew prior to the approach.
At 1750 hrs, during the aircraft's descent to the north of Farnborough, under the control of Ockham
Sector of the London Area and Terminal Control Centre (LATCC), the commander indicated to the
controller that he would like to try the PAR approach to Farnborough if possible and also requested
the current weather at Southampton. During the conversation, the commander indicated that he was
not sure if he could make the approach under UK regulations. The controller indicated that he
would coordinate the request with Farnborough ATC. A handover telephone conversation then took
place at 1751 hrs between LATCC and Farnborough controllers, during which the possibility of the
aircraft diverting to Southampton was mentioned. There was no reference during this conversation
to the pilot being unsure if he could make the approach under UK regulations.
At 1753 hrs, the LATCC controller indicated to the commander that Farnborough had been
informed of the pilot's request and transferred the aircraft to Farnborough Radar control. On initial
contact, the Farnborough radar controller sought to confirm his understanding that the aircraft was
going to make an approach at Farnborough. The commander responded that if it was 'OK with your
ops' then he would like to 'try the approach' and requested a PAR precision approach. The radar
controller confirmed that the approach would be a PAR to Runway 25 and read the latest actual
weather report, later confirming that the current RVR was 200 metres. He also indicated that 'our
ops will have no reason not to accept you' and 'you're making the approach on your minima.'
The aircraft was cleared to land just prior to the start of the final descent at 1803 hrs. A normal
radar talkdown followed, with the aircraft following the specified 3.5° glidepath accurately. Only
minor heading changes were required by the radar controller to keep the aircraft close to the
runway extended centreline throughout. Just prior to 1805 hrs, the controller indicated that the
aircraft was approaching procedure minimum and instructed a right turn by two degrees as the
aircraft was slightly left of centreline and on the glidepath. On passing the procedure minimum, the
aircraft was instructed to 'continue visually or go-around' in accordance with the normal
phraseology. In response to this, the non-handling pilot indicated that the lights were in sight and
the aircraft would continue the approach.
Prior to the commencement of the approach, the aircraft's Flight Management System (FMS) had
been programmed with the runway threshold data, centreline and a 3.5° approach glidepath
constructed. The commander's Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) was set to FMS Primary with
Localiser displayed in the background. The copilot HSI display was set to Localiser. The approach
was flown in Heading Mode to facilitate compliance with ATC instructions. The flight director
system therefore produced lateral and vertical guidance during the approach. The commander had
briefed the copilot that the Decision Altitude would be 510 feet amsl, VREF 125 kt and calls were to
be made for 'have lights', 'have runway' or 'go-around' as appropriate.
At Decision Altitude, the copilot called to the commander that the lights were in sight. The
commander therefore decided to continue the approach and the copilot informed ATC accordingly.
Immediately following this exchange, the commander asked the copilot 'how does it look?' The
copilot had momentarily looked away from the approach lighting and, on checking again, became
confused as to whether the aircraft was on centreline or to one side of the lights, so he delayed his
response to the commander's question. The commander looked up from the flight instruments and
saw some lights, a paved surface and line markings ahead of him so continued to land the aircraft.
The aircraft touched down on the tarmac surface that comprised the intersection of taxiways M and
N to Runway 25. The touchdown vector was parallel to Runway 25, but displaced approximately
15 feet to the left of the left hand edge of it. After the aircraft had passed the intersections, both
main wheels ran onto the grass surface, where they remained for the duration of the landing. Lift
dump flaps were deployed with idle reverse thrust and minimum braking. The total landing run was
524 metres.
The crew informed ATC of the location of the aircraft and the airfield emergency services were
deployed. The crew started the aircraft's APU and shutdown the engines. The aircraft was later
recovered without further damage. However, the right trailing edge flap needed replacement, and
both engines were returned to an overhaul agent for inspection after the ingestion of a significant
amount of mud.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422ee2940f0b613460001f9/dft_avsafety_pdf_502221.pdf
https://www.airliners.net/photo/EMC-Corporation/British-Aerospace-BAe-125-800/7347657 (Photo)
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 05-Oct-2025 12:10 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 05-Oct-2025 12:11 | Justanormalperson | Updated [Accident report, ] |
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