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| Date: | Monday 14 October 1996 |
| Time: | c. 11:24 LT |
| Type: |  Boeing 747-312 |
| Owner/operator: | Ansett Australia Airlines |
| Registration: | VH-INJ |
| MSN: | 23029/590 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1983 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | 55 KM South of Hamilton Island VOR, QLD -
 Australia
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Sydney-Kingsford Smith Airport, NSW (SYD/YSSY) |
| Osaka-Kansai International Airport (KIX/RJBB) | |
| Investigating agency: | BASI |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
A Boeing 747 (B747) was en route from Sydney to Osaka, tracking via Narrabri, Hamilton Island and Port Moresby. The crew had originally planned at flight level (FL) 310 with the intention of climbing to FL350 prior to entering Papua New Guinea airspace. After departing Sydney, the crew calculated that the aircraft could immediately climb to FL330 and requested a change to that level. This was a non-standard level for the planned track. As the B747 flight was to be conducted under radar control while in Australian airspace, the controller granted approval for the crew to operate at FL330. Subsequently, the change to a non-standard level, for the track being flown, was co-ordinated with all other controllers responsible for the Australian airspace through which the B747 would pass.
A Boeing 737 (B737) had departed from Cairns on a flight to Brisbane and was tracking direct to Mackay at FL330. This aircraft was operating at a standard level for the intended track.
The B747 entered the airspace under the jurisdiction of the Brisbane Sector 7S radar controller as the aircraft passed 75 NM to the west of Rockhampton. To ensure adequate coverage of the sector, the controller was using the 180-NM scale on the radar display. Within the sector, the track of the B747 was to cross five other routes which either converged or intersected. Aircraft using these other routes could operate at standard and non-standard levels relative to the track of the B747.
Sector 7 had two radar positions - Sector 7S and Sector 7V. Additionally, there was a planner position located between these radar positions. The planner controller was assisting the Sector 7V controller and not the Sector 7S controller.
The actual time the B737 entered the Sector 7S area, south of Townsville, was not determined. However, based on groundspeed calculations made by the investigation team, the B737 was estimated to have entered the sector approximately 5 - 10 minutes after the B747. The controller was busy at the time and satisfied with the overall traffic situation but did not appreciate the possibility of the two aircraft coming into conflict. The B747 was at FL330 as it approached Hamilton Island from the south. The tracks for the two aircraft crossed 33 NM south-south-east of Hamilton Island. As the aircraft approached the crossing point, the radar controller was required to coordinate and separate a number of departures from Mackay and Hamilton Island airports.
The horizontal separation between the B747 and the B737 aircraft had reduced to 5.5 NM before the controller observed the proximity of the two aircraft on the radar display. The controller instructed the crew of the B737 to turn right to pass behind the B747.
The crew of the B737 sighted the B747 as the controller issued the avoidance instructions. The crew had previously observed the B747 in the distance, but had not perceived it as an aircraft. They were about to request clarification from the controller about a possible aircraft approaching them, when they were advised to turn right. The B737 crew complied with and acknowledged the instruction. The controller subsequently issued traffic information on the B747 to the crew of the B737.
The crew of the B747 received a Traffic Advisory (TA) warning on the aircraft's Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), which indicated traffic at the 10-o'clock position at 4 NM. The crew looked for the traffic but did not sight the B737.
The two aircraft passed with a horizontal separation of approximately 2.4 NM and at the same level. The minimum separation standard required was 5 NM horizontally or 2,000 ft vertically. There was a breakdown of separation.
Contributing Factors:
1. The planned route of the B747 crossed a number of other routes which could have other traffic at the same level.
2. The controller was responsible for the provision of different services within a sector in which a number of areas required close monitoring concurrently.
3. The controller's attention was focused on separating traffic located immediately to the south of Mackay to the detriment of maintaining a regular scan throughout the total area of his responsibility.
4. The controller believed he was coping with the situation and did not consider requesting assistance from the planner controller.
5. The planner controller was assisting the Sector 7V controller and was unable to assist the Sector 7S controller.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/4932345/199603722.pdf
https://www.jetphotos.com/photo/6391281 (Photo)
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 12-Oct-2025 23:10 | Justanormalperson | Added |
| 12-Oct-2025 23:12 | Justanormalperson | Updated |
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