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| Date: | Tuesday 27 March 2012 |
| Time: | |
| Type: |  Mitsubishi MU-2B-26 |
| Owner/operator: | SAAB |
| Registration: | SE-IOZ |
| MSN: | 320 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1974 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | NE of Stockholm-Skavsta Airport -
 Sweden
|
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | |
| Departure airport: | |
| Stockholm-Skavsta Airport | |
| Investigating agency: | SHK |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Serious incident involving aircraft SE-IOZ and SE-LTH northeast of Stockholm/Skavsta Airport, Södermanland County.
A MU-2B, registration SE-IOZ, was flying in from the north toward Stockholm/Skavsta Airport. The aircraft had been cleared for a visual approach to runway 26 by the Östgöta approach control unit (Östgöta TMC).
The Skavsta tower controller asked the crew to confirm that they would maintain an altitude of 2,000 feet until the final approach. However, the aircraft had already descended through 1,500 feet, and the crew replied “no” to the question.
At the same time, another aircraft — a PA-28-181, registration SE-LTH — had departed visually from runway 34 at the same airport, turning right toward the exit point Bogsta and climbing to 1,500 feet. The transponder of SE-LTH, however, was transmitting incorrect altitude data.
The flight paths of the two aircraft crossed, resulting in a separation that was below the required minimum.
The loss of separation was caused by altitude restrictions originally intended for noise abatement being used for traffic separation without an appropriate clearance having been issued.
According to recorded radar tracks, the aircraft met at a horizontal distance of approximately 900 metres. The vertical separation could not be determined from radar returns because the SE-LTH transponder reported incorrect values. According to interview data, the vertical separation was approximately 200 feet (61 metres).
The minimum separation between aircraft, which should be at least 3 nautical miles (approximately 5 500 metres) horizontally or 500 feet (approximately 150 metres) vertically, was thus undershot.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
SHK
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 28-Oct-2025 08:49 | ASN | Added |
| 29-Oct-2025 19:47 | ASN | Updated [Operator, Total fatalities, Total occupants, Location, Phase, Destination airport, Source, Damage, Narrative, ] |
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