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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 83059
Last updated: 14 August 2020
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Type:Silhouette image of generic A343 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Airbus A340-313X
Registration: OH-LQD
C/n / msn: 921
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 272
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Location:Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH) -   Hong Kong
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Hong Kong-Chek Lap Kok International Airport (HKG/VHHH)
Destination airport:Helsinki-Vantaa Airport (HEL/EFHK)
The incident occurred at night time during which FIN070 was cleared by ATC to taxi on Taxiway B westbound for departure on Runway 07L. When the aircraft was approaching the western end of Taxiway B, ATC cleared the aircraft for take-off on Runway 07L. The aircraft took the normal right turn at the end of Taxiway B towards Runway 07L but then took a premature right turn onto Taxiway A, a taxiway parallel to and in between the runway-in-use and Taxiway B. With the help of the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS) provided in the Control Tower, ATC observed that the aircraft commenced take-off roll on Taxiway A. On detecting the anomaly, ATC immediately instructed the pilot to stop rolling and the aircraft was stopped abeam Taxiway A5, approximately 1400 metres from the beginning (western end) of Taxiway A.

The following causal factors were identified:

1 A combination of sudden surge in cockpit workload and the difficulties experienced by both the Captain and the First Officer in stowing the EFB computers at a critical point of taxiing shortly before take-off had distracted their attention from the external environment that resulted in a momentary degradation of situation awareness.
2 The SOP did not provide a sufficiently robust process for the verification of the departure runway before commencement of the take-off roll.
3 The safety defence of having the First Officer and the Relief Pilot to support and monitor the Captain’s taxiing was not sufficiently effective as the Captain was the only person in the cockpit trained for ground taxi.



Photo of OH-LQD courtesy

Helsinki - Vantaa (EFHK / HEL)
10 April 2017; (c) Pertti Sipilä

Revision history:

03-Dec-2010 13:50 harro Added
23-Dec-2010 15:11 harro Updated [Date, Time, Total occupants, Source, Narrative]
13-Jan-2012 14:17 harro Updated [Source, Narrative]

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