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Gol flight G3 1674, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, collided with a vehicle during a night time takeoff from runway 10 at Rio de Janeiro/Galeão International Airport (GIG/SBGL), Brazil.
The takeoff was aborted at about 149 kt, and the aircraft came to a full stop on the runway. ARFF attended and all passengers deplaned via airstairs on the runway.

At 22:03:18 local time, the runway-lighting maintenance vehicle, Chevrolet pick-up truck, contacted the Tower, requesting authorization to enter runway 10, using the callsign “Manutenção Balizamento.”
After coordinating the vehicle’s movement with the ATCO assigned to the TWR Control position, the Supervisor authorized the vehicle to enter the runway at 22:03:45, requesting that the runway be reported clear upon completion of the work.
Due to the entry of the maintenance vehicle onto the runway, the ATCO at the TWR Control position initiated the screen locking procedure of their TATIC traffic flow management system.
This procedure aimed to mitigate runway incursion occurrences and was to be performed whenever there was an inspection, maintenance, or any other event restricting the runway’s use for takeoffs or landings.
The TATIC screen locking should remain activated until the vehicle exited, and the runway was subsequently cleared for normal operation.
In the following four minutes, the ATCO at the TWR Control position engaged in non-operational conversations with the ATCO at the Ground Control position. 
At 22:07:03, the ATCO at the TWR Control position unlocked the TATIC screen without verifying whether the vehicle had vacated the runway. Immediately afterward, the ATCO called flight 1674, authorizing takeoff on runway 10, without visually scanning the runway.
At that moment, the Supervisor, distracted while handling a mobile phone, did not notice that the ATCO had failed to comply with the procedures by prematurely unlocking the TATC screen.
At 22:07:51, the ATCO at the TWR Control position turned to the Supervisor and asked whether the maintenance vehicle had been removed from the runway: “Did you remove maintenance?” Right away, the Supervisor replied: -“No, no!” The ATCO at the TWR Control position reacted with surprise: “Oh my God!” However, he did not cancel aircraft flight 1674's takeoff.
At 22:08:00, the Supervisor made a call to the lighting-maintenance vehicle, requesting it to clear runway 10. However, the ATCO did not check the vehicle’s position, did not instruct an immediate vacation of the runway, and did not inform the personnel that an aircraft was initiating a takeoff on that runway.
At that moment, the aircraft’s ground speed was 50 kt, which would still allow a Rejected Takeoff (RTO) under low-energy conditions.
At 22:08:17, the lighting-maintenance vehicle reported it would vacate the runway via Taxiway CC.
At 22:08:32, the aircraft and the maintenance vehicle collided. The truck's cabin was crushed by the aircraft. The two persons in the vehicle suffered minor injuries.

The pilots sighted the vehicle about 0.5 second before impact, at an estimated distance of 185 meters, at which time the aircraft’s indicated speed was approximately 153 knots. In an attempt to avoid direct impact of the landing gear with the vehicle and a possible excursion off the right side of the runway, the pilots executed an evasive ground maneuver.

Contributing factors.
- Attention – a contributor.
The presence of distracting stimuli in the control room led to reduced selective attention, the occurrence of lapses, and loss of situational awareness, impairing risk perception and timely decision-making. As a result, the ATCO performing the TWR Control function did not pay attention to the operational scenario at the time of the occurrence and cleared the takeoff of aircraft PS-GPP on runway 10, which was occupied by a maintenance vehicle.
- Attitude – a contributor.
The ATCO performing the TWR Control function did not conduct a visual scan of the runway, evidencing an attitude of noncompliance with the established operational procedures.
At the time of the occurrence, the Supervisor was not attentive to the activities being carried out by the on-duty controllers, as he was handling a cell phone, diverting from his duty to maintain continuous supervision. Furthermore, the passive stance adopted during and after the emergency proved inadequate, contrary to the responsibilities
inherent to the role.
- Work group culture – a contributor.
The climate of excessive informality, tolerance for cell phone use, and non-operational conversations revealed a permissive group culture that normalized behaviors incompatible with operational safety, fostering the repetition of errors and weakening defensive barriers.
Furthermore, during interviews conducted by the SIPAER Investigation Committee, it was found that some ATCOs believed that, after the formal deactivation of the Supervisor function at 22h00min, the controller previously designated for this role ceased to be responsible for monitoring the control and surveillance actions performed by the other on-duty ATCOs.
Based on this mistaken interpretation, the controller who had been acting as Supervisor considered himself exempt from the responsibility of instructing the ATCO at the TWR Control position to abort the takeoff of aircraft PS-GPP, as well as from providing proper support to the other controllers in the emergency response actions.
- Organizational culture – a contributor.
The recurrence of operational failures, even after similar events, combined with the low effectiveness of the corrective actions adopted, revealed weaknesses in the organizational culture. The tolerance of behaviors not in compliance with standards and regulations – particularly regarding cell phone use and failure to use headsets – pointed to shortcomings in the institutional mechanisms for positively reinforcing a safety culture.
- Team dynamics – a contributor.
Failures were observed in the interaction among members of the TWR-GL team, characterized by the absence of support from the Supervisor, confusion among the ATCOs after the collision, and inefficiency in task management at this critical moment. These aspects indicated dysfunctions in mutual collaboration mechanisms, which compromised the effectiveness of the services provided by TWR-GL and the timeliness of actions related to the emergency response in the context of the occurrence.
- Memory – a contributor.
The omission of the runway visual scan and the verification of the locking screen on the TATIC system evidenced operational lapses related to memory failures associated with the execution of routine procedures. Such lapses were exacerbated by distractions and interruptions in the operational environment, which impaired the retention and retrieval of critical information.
As a result of this memory lapse, the ATCO responsible for the TWR Control function inadvertently cleared the aircraft for takeoff while the runway was still occupied by a vehicle, contributing to the occurrence.
- Perception – a contributor.
The failure to perceive the vehicle on the runway indicated impairments in the process of organizing and interpreting environmental stimuli and revealed a degraded state of situational awareness, which facilitated the continuation of an incorrect operational procedure.
Thus, by not correctly perceiving the scenario and its critical elements, the ATCOs were unable to anticipate the high probability of a collision between the aircraft and the vehicle, compromising the safety of the operation.
- Decision-making process – a contributor.
The decision to maintain the takeoff clearance, even after recalling the presence of the vehicle on the runway, evidenced a failure in the controllers’ decision-making process. The hesitation to cancel the clearance revealed poor judgment and difficulty in assessing the risks, compromising timely analysis of the scenario.
Had the clearance been revoked within seconds after the recollection, the aircraft would have initiated a low-speed rejected takeoff, allowing it to come to a safe stop before the collision. Thus, the ATCOs’ incorrect decision proved to be a determining factor for the event, highlighting deficiencies in identifying viable alternatives and executing an
appropriate response in the face of imminent risk.
- Organizational processes – a contributor.
Although mitigation measures had been adopted, the persistence of the same operational behaviors demonstrated their ineffectiveness in addressing the contributing factors identified in previous events. This indicated the need to revise organizational strategies, focusing on actions that would strengthen the safety culture, the effectiveness of operational barriers, and governance over critical processes. In this way, the prevailing organizational system contributed to the persistence of significant operational vulnerabilities.
- Supervision (ATS) – a contributor.
In the moments leading up to the collision between the aircraft and the vehicle, the Supervisor did not adequately monitor the control and surveillance actions performed by the ATCO responsible for the TWR Control position. Such monitoring could have enabled a timely and assertive intervention capable of preventing the occurrence.
- Managerial oversight (ATS) – a contributor.
The recurrence of operational errors and of the corrective actions adopted revealed shortcomings in the oversight exercised by CRCEA-SE, whose duties included ensuring compliance with applicable regulations, guaranteeing the effectiveness of the SMS, and promoting an organizational culture focused on operational safety.

Source

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<blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p lang="pt" dir="ltr">Deus é grande. <br><br>Estou no RJ. Na hora da decolagem agora no Galeão, o avião que eu estava COLIDIU com uma viatura. Ainda bem que deu tempo de frear antes do final da pista. <br><br>Baita susto. <br><br>Sensação de que nasci de novo. <br><br>Dá pra ouvir o barulho no vídeo. <a href="https://t.co/3befNU8AZy">pic.twitter.com/3befNU8AZy</a></p>— Átilla de Oliveira (@atilladoliveira) <a href="https://twitter.com/atilladoliveira/status/1889490018013499473?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">February 12, 2025</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>

<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-media-max-width="560"><p lang="pt" dir="ltr">Veja como ficou danificado o Boeing 737 MAX 8 da GOL que atingiu uma caminhonete Chevrolet S10 (Colorado) ontem durante a decolagem no Galeão <a href="https://t.co/71yEGEY0aM">pic.twitter.com/71yEGEY0aM</a></p>— AEROIN (@aero_in) <a href="https://twitter.com/aero_in/status/1889648356965724642?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">February 12, 2025</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script>

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