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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 147120
Last updated: 8 March 2021
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Date:09-APR-2004
Time:19:31
Type:Silhouette image of generic A343 model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Airbus A340-313X
Owner/operator:Emirates Airlines
Registration: A6-ERN
C/n / msn: 166
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 274
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: Minor
Location:Johannesburg International Airport (JNB) -   South Africa
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Johannesburg International Airport (JNB)
Destination airport:Dubai Airport (DXB)
Narrative:
An Airbus A340-313X passenger plane sustained damage in a takeoff incident at Johannesburg International Airport (JNB), South Africa. There were 260 passengers and 14 crew members on board.
The day before the incident, the crew had operated from Dubai to Johannesburg in an Airbus A340-300 and on that occasion the First Officer was the pilot flying (PF). That flight had been the first occasion either pilot had actually operated, or been in, the Airbus A340-300 apart from their flight simulator experience. The crew were licensed to participate in Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF), but had previously only operated the Airbus A340-500 and the Airbus A330-200. On the take-off from Dubai, both crew members noticed that, whilst the aircraft performed adequately, the Airbus A340-300 seemed to have visibly less performance than other Airbus types they were familiar with.
Emirates night flight 764 back to Dubai was cleared to takeoff from Johannesburg's 4,420m (14,500 feet) runway 21R.
After a normal application of the reduced, flexible, thrust all required calls were made and the aircraft behavior was entirely normal. With the power set, both crew stated that they considered the aircraft acceleration to be slow, in comparison to the other types which they flew (Airbus A330-200 and Airbus A340-500), but that this matched their expectations, in light of their experience the previous day and the Captain's earlier briefing.
The Captain maintained the aircraft on the centreline as it accelerated, with the First Officer monitoring airspeed , the engine instruments and the centreline tracking, etc. During the initial ground run the PF applied a forward stick control input as described in the Flight Crew Operating Manual to counter the nose up effect of setting engine takeoff thrust to about 80 knots. At 75 knots the Side Stick Order Indicator (SSOI) started moving back to the centre position as the PF centralized the sides tick. As the aircraft approached 144 knots the First Officer called "V1" and this was reiterated by the auto call-out. At 152 knots the First Officer called "rotate". The Captain stated that, at this point he went fully onto instruments, to ensure the rotation was as accurate as possible. His understanding of the new technique was to achieve 2/3 back stick, by bringing the stick rearward at a measured rate, over three seconds. This he achieved by cross-referring to the SSOI and finally placing the SSOI at +9 on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) pitch scale, to initiate rotation and to maintain this, to get the aircraft airborne. Thereafter to follow the flight director Speed Reference System (SRS) pitch command.
Recorded data shows that, in initiating the rotation, the Captain applied rearward sidestick such that the SSOI, displayed on the PFD indicated +9 and that, after approximately 4 seconds the aircraft nose started to move upwards at a normal rate.
The Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data then shows that, over the next 3 seconds and simultaneously with the pitch up, there was a progressive relaxation of the rearward stick input, which had the effect of keeping the SSOI in its original position on the PFD but also decreased the nose up pitch demand. Over the next two seconds, the aircraft pitch attitude stopped increasing with a maximum achieved value of +5.6 and, after a further 4 seconds, the pitch attitude had decreased to +3.5. With the aircraft main wheels still on the ground, the SSOI remained displayed on the PFD and the Captain continued to control the SSOI at go nose up on the PFD, failing to realize that, to do so, he had moved the stick forward from the original 2/3 back position, thereby lowering the nose and keeping the aircraft on the ground. Keep in mind that the moment the aircraft start to rotate and the nose rise, the horizon indication on the PFD start to sink lower on the PFD display. With the PF attempting to keep the SSOI at a 9 relative to the horizon effectively caused him to relax backpressure on the stick and thus lowers the aircraft's nose.
The next thing that ei

Sources:

Air Transport Intelligence news


Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
26-Jul-2012 07:21 harro Added

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