ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 188040
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| Date: | Saturday 11 June 2016 |
| Time: | 17:36 |
| Type: |  Aeronca 7AC Champ |
| Owner/operator: | Private |
| Registration: | N82694 |
| MSN: | 7AC-1336 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1946 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 4095 hours |
| Engine model: | Continental A65-8 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 2 |
| Aircraft damage: | Substantial |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | St Clair County, Brooklyn, IL -
 United States of America
|
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Private |
| Departure airport: | Columbia, IL (H49) |
| Columbia, IL (H49) | |
| Investigating agency: | NTSB |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
The airline transport pilot and passenger departed on a local flight from an uncontrolled airport. The pilot flew for about 15 minutes when he heard "a loud noise, a rattle," and the engine lost total power. He chose to conduct a forced landing on a section of closed highway; however, the pilot was unable to slow the airplane and impacted barricades at the end of the road closure.
Postaccident examination of the engine revealed two holes through the top of the crankcase, and cylinders No. 1 and No. 2 were separated from their mounts on the crankcase. Inside the No. 2 cylinder, the connecting rod was found fractured just below the piston head. Upon further examination of the connecting rod, the piston pin, which was manufactured from resulfurized steel, was also found fractured inside the connecting rod bore.
The No. 2 cylinder failed due to a fractured piston pin that retained the connecting rod inside the piston crown underside. The fracture of the piston pin led to misalignment of the connecting rod, which eventually failed from fatigue in reverse bending. The fatigue stresses on the connecting rod were relatively low, consistent with most of the fracture surface exhibiting fatigue propagating from multiple crack initiation sites. The piston pin likely fractured first, in part exacerbated by intergranular cracking in the outer, case-hardened layer. Resulfurized steels, designed for better machinability, exhibit reduced notch toughness and ductility. Carburizing or carbonitriding of these steels is generally not recommended, as the surface treatment can increase susceptibility to intergranular fracture in the hardened condition. In addition, the degree of the surface case hardening was deeper than typical for this alloy. It is likely that a stress high enough to fracture the outer layer would lead to through-fracture of the pin. However, the location of the pin fracture was such that immediate failure of the engine did not occur until the connecting rod subsequently fractured from fatigue. The pin had been partially embrittled by the surface case hardening, which sufficiently lowered the fracture toughness to cause the pin to fracture prematurely.
Probable Cause: A total loss of engine power due to fracture of the piston pin, which led to fatigue cracking and eventual fracture of the adjacent connecting rod.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
NTSB
FAA register: http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=82694
Location
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 12-Jun-2016 00:57 | Geno | Added |
| 13-Jun-2016 18:30 | Geno | Updated [Aircraft type, Registration, Cn, Operator, Location, Source, Narrative] |
| 19-Apr-2020 06:59 | ASN Update Bot | Updated [Time, Nature, Departure airport, Destination airport, Source, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
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