ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 189272
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| Date: | Thursday 17 March 2016 |
| Time: | 20:43 |
| Type: |  ATR 42-500 |
| Owner/operator: | DOT LT, opf Danish Air Transport |
| Registration: | LY-DAT |
| MSN: | 445 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1994 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 13 |
| Aircraft damage: | None |
| Category: | Serious incident |
| Location: | near Esbjerg -
 Denmark
|
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Esbjerg Airport (EBJ/EKEB) |
| Billund Airport (BLL/EKBI) | |
| Investigating agency: | HCLJ |
| Confidence Rating: |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Flight DX24 was the last leg of an afternoon round trip from Billund, Denmark to Esbjerg,Denmark and Stavanger, Norway. Before the first flight the aircraft was refueled. The indicated total fuel onboard was 3339 kilos.
The flights to Stavanger and back to Esbjerg were performed as a line check of the left-hand seated pilot training for an upgrade to commander.
At Esbjerg, the trainee pilot had passed the line check and acted as commander of the flight from Esbjerg to Billund.
The aircraft took off from runway 26 at Esbjerg and at around 1000 feet altitude mean sea level the right engine flamed out. The flight crew performed the ‘engine flame out at take-off’ emergency checklist memory items.
When the aircraft was stabilized at 3000 feet (msl) altitude, and no engine damage was suspected, the flight crew performed the ‘engine restart in flight’ checklist. For a few seconds, the engine interstage turbine temperature increased, but the engine did not restart. After completion of the ‘single engine operation checklist’ and other remaining checklist items, the flight crew informed Esbjerg Aerodrome Flight Information Service (AFIS) about the engine flame out, and that the flight crew intended to continue the flight to EKBI.
Esbjerg AFIS informed Billund Air Traffic Control (ATC) about the situation.
The aircraft was transferred to Billund Approach (APP) and continued to Billund with only the left engine operating.
On approach to Billund, the flight crew got radar vectors from Billund Approach and established the aircraft on the localizer to runway 27. The aircraft was transferred to Billund Tower (TWR).
Billund TWR informed the flight crew that the Instrument Landing System (ILS) category 1 was in operation and that the flight crew of the previously landed aircraft reported the approach lights in sight at an altitude of 200 feet above ground level.
On short final to runway 27, the commander (non-flying) observed that the left engine torque indication had dropped to zero, the autopilot disconnected, and the first officer (pilot flying) removed his left hand from the power lever and grabbed the control wheel with both hands.
The commander rapidly moved the left engine power lever forward. At the same time, the flight crew and the cabin crew heard loud bangs from the left engine. The cabin crew observed flames at the rear bottom of the left engine and reported ’engine fire’ to the flight crew.
Shortly after, the aircraft landed on runway 27. The aircraft vacated runway 27 via taxiway C. Because engine fire was reported by the cabin crew, the flight crew stopped the aircraft on taxiway C. The flight crew pulled the fire handles and discharged the fire bottles of both engines.
The cabin crew observed no fire from the left engine. The cabin crew evacuated the passengers via the airstair door located at the rear end of the cabin on the left side of the aircraft fuselage. The fire and rescue services observed no fire from the engines.
Conclusions:
Shortly after take off from Esbjerg (EKEB), the right engine flamed out due to fuel starvation.
Despite the fuel quantity indication system indicated more than 500 kg of fuel in the right tank, the right fuel tank was later found to be empty.
During the single engine approach, the left engine suddenly suffered from compressor stall, and flames were seen from the exhaust. The flight crew interpreted the flames as being an engine fire.
Upon landing, the aircraft vacated the runway, the left engine was shut down, and the crew evacuated the aircraft.
The safety investigation found that the fault in the fuel quantity indication system originated from the right tank probe no. 3.
Few months prior to the serious incident, maintenance personnel removed and reinstalled the fuel tank probes. The AIB finds it probable that the fault on probe no. 3 was introduced during this process.
The left engine suffered from high deterioration and damages to the hot section. This made the engine subjectable to compressor stall.
Accident investigation:
 |
|
Sources:
http://www.havarikommissionen.dk/index.php?lang=da
Revision history:
| Date/time | Contributor | Updates |
|---|---|---|
| 14-Aug-2016 16:24 | harro | Added |
| 07-Mar-2019 21:00 | harro | Updated [Departure airport, Destination airport, Narrative, Accident report, ] |
Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description
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