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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 195325
Last updated: 20 October 2017
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Date:02-MAR-2017
Time:16:38 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8B model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-202Q Dash 8
Owner/operator:Air Greenland
Registration: OY-GRO
C/n / msn: 482
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 29
Other fatalities:0
Airplane damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:Kangerlussuaq-Søndre Strømfjord Airport (SFJ/BGSF) -   Greenland
Phase: Take off
Nature:Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:Kangerlussuaq-Søndre Strømfjord Airport (SFJ/BGSF)
Destination airport:Sisimiut Airport (JHS/BGSS)
Investigating agency: HCLJ Denmark
Narrative:
Air Greenland flight GL235 was involved in a serious runway incursion incident on takeoff from Kangerlussuaq Airport in Greenland.
The aircraft, a DHC-8-200 was scheduled to depart for Sisimiut, Greenland at 15:35 UTC. The flight was about an hour late when it received taxi instructions at 16:36 UTC.
The Sondrestrom Tower (TWR) controller cleared the flight to line up on runway 27 via taxiway A. The flight crew of OY-GRO read back the taxi instructions.
Sondrestrom TWR then instructed three runway snow clearing vehicles to vacate runway 27.
The flight crew of OY-GRO lined up the aircraft on runway 27 and completed the before take-off checklist. The flight crew was in doubt about whether or not a take-off clearance had been issued but agreed that the aircraft was cleared for take-off.
There was no visual contact with the three runway snow clearing vehicles on runway 27 because of the runway downslope.
The student air traffic controller at Sondrestrom TWR observed that OY-GRO had started its take-off roll and pointed it out to the instructor air traffic controller. For a short while, the instructor air traffic controller considered an instruction on aborting the take-off roll of OY-GRO, but noticed that OY-GRO started rotating.
When OY-GRO rotated, the horizontal separation to the nearest runway snow clearing vehicle on the runway was approximately 900 meters. The vertical separation, when OY-GRO passed overhead the nearest runway snow clearing vehicle on the runway, was approximately 300 feet.


CONCLUSIONS:
OY-GRO departed from an engaged runway at BGSF without an ATC take-off clearance.
To the AIB, the following combined conditions had an influence on the sequence of events:
- The actual flight was approximately one hour behind the scheduled time of departure.
- An over-motivated flight crew acted from their expectations rather than the factual reality.
- Runway downslope prevented the flight crew from spotting the three runway snow clearing vehicles.
- Soft safety barriers like the applied ATC phraseology and the flight crew standard operating procedures on use of landing lights did not provoke or raise the attention of the flight crew in such a way that their decision making process changed.

Sources:

http://havarikommissionen.dk/index.php?option=com_contentbuilder&title=search-aviation-hclj510-2017-324-bulletin&controller=details&id=4&record_id=672&Itemid=225&limitstart=0&filter_order=&lang=en

Accident investigation:
cover
Investigating agency: HCLJ Denmark
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 70 days (2 months)
Accident number: HCLJ510-2017-324
Download report: Final report

Images:


Revision history:

Date/timeContributorUpdates
11-May-2017 19:16 harro Added
11-May-2017 19:27 harro Updated [Narrative, Photo, ]

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