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ASN Wikibase Occurrence # 229360
Last updated: 11 April 2021
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Time:14:58 UTC
Type:Silhouette image of generic DH8B model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
de Havilland Canada DHC-8-202Q
Owner/operator:Air Greenland
Registration: OY-GRJ
C/n / msn: 496
Fatalities:Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: 32
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage: None
Category:Serious incident
Location:Nuuk (BGGH) -   Greenland
Phase: Take off
Nature:Passenger - Scheduled
Departure airport:Nuuk Airport (GOH/BGGH)
Destination airport:Kangerlussuaq-Søndre Strømfjord Airport (SFJ/BGSF)
Investigating agency: HCLJ Denmark
Air Greenland flight GL548 was a commercial scheduled flight from Nuuk (BGGH) to Kangerlussuaq (BGSF). Three crewmembers and 29 passengers were onboard the aircraft. The commander was the pilot monitoring, and the first officer was the pilot flying.
Before the flight and in order to mitigate a forward center of gravity issue, an off duty crewmember moved from the cockpit jump seat to a passenger seat. The CG was now calculated to be within limits.
Before engine start, the first officer made a departure briefing including information on aircraft takeoff configuration (a flap setting of 15°), a V1 (decision speed) equal to VR (rotation speed) of 88 knots, and a review of the aborted take-off procedure.
After engine start, Nuuk AFIS reported no traffic on the runway and the wind conditions to be 330°and 3 knots. The aircraft then taxied to take-off position on runway 05 and the flight crew completed the before take-off checklist which including a check of aircraft flight controls without remarks.
The first officer then initiated the take-off roll. During the take-off roll, the commander called Sixty (airspeed), and the first officer confirmed.
At approximately 80 knots, the commander called Vee-One-Rotate. The first officer applied normal back pressure to the elevator control but experienced no positive responsive feedback (aircraft rotation) and consequentially applied full aft backpressure to the elevator control.
The first officer received no positive responsive feedback (aircraft rotation), and considered the lack of aircraft rotation to be a result of a flight control failure and aborted the take-off by retarding the power levers to DISC position and applying maximum anti-skid braking.
The aircraft came to a full stop approximately 50 meters before the end of runway 05. The flight crew discussed different scenarios and agreed that the sequence of events did not prevent them from making a safe taxi back to the apron.

The mass and balance calculation, based on actual masses (an increase of masses compared to standard masses of approximately 13% on crew, wardrobe, passengers and carry-on hand baggage), prepared by the investigators resulted in a CG 2.4 inches forward of and outside aircraft operational CG limitations.

HCLJ Conclusions:
Actual masses above standard masses on crew, passengers and carry-on hand baggage led to a CG forward of the operational aircraft CG limitations causing reduced aircraft rotation ability during the take-off roll.


Accident investigation:
Investigating agency: HCLJ Denmark
Status: Investigation completed
Duration: 3 months
Download report: Final report


Photo of OY-GRJ courtesy

Ilulissat (BGJN / JAV)
2 September 2017; (c) Robbie Shaw

Revision history:

26-Sep-2019 11:42 harro Added
26-Sep-2019 11:45 harro Updated [Narrative]

Corrections or additions? ... Edit this accident description